Balochi is a northwestern Iranian language, most closely related to Kurdish.

By Akhilesh Pillalamarri

The arid region of Balochistan, situated at the eastern end of the Iranian plateau, is split almost evenly between Pakistan’s Balochistan province and Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province (a small portion of the southern parts of Afghanistan’s Nimruz, Helmand, and Kandahar provinces are also part of Baluchistan). Balochistan is today at the forefront of major geopolitical events. Pakistan has faced almost constant turmoil in Balochistan since its independence, even as it struggles to secure and develop the region with Chinese help.

The port access offered by Gwadar in Balochistan is an important component in China’s emerging transportation network across Asia. Right across the border in Iran, India is struggling to complete Chabahar, its attempt to answer Gwadar and link to Afghanistan by going around Pakistan. Iranian Balochistan is Iran’s soft underbelly, a restless Sunni region in a mostly Shia country, a place where Saudi Arabia can make mischief using groups like the radical Sunni Jundallah.

But what about Balochistan itself? How did it come to be divided and ruled by other peoples? Surprisingly, very little has been written about Balochistan. It has always been uncomfortably sandwiched between the great Persian and Indian empires to its west and east. And unlike their Afghan neighbors to the north, who also felt the constant tug of war between Persia and India, the people of Balochistan had no mountains to protect them. It is a region at once neglected, exploited, and ignored.

Balochistan takes its names from the Baloch who inhabit it, a mostly Sunni Muslim people who speak an Iranian language, Balochi, that is oddly classified neither as an eastern Iranian language like Pashto to its north or a southwestern Iranian language like Persian to its west. Rather, Balochi is a northwestern Iranian language, most closely related to Kurdish. It is thus a matter of some conjecture as to when and how the Baloch actually got to Balochistan.

In ancient times, the region was a part of the Achaemenid Persian Empire and then various Persian and Indian empires and local kingdoms and was presumably inhabited by some mix of Iranian and Indian peoples. People in Baluchistan followed Hinduism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism. The region acquired a notorious reputation due to Alexander the Great disastrously marching back to Babylon after his Indian campaign through its deserts, leading to the deaths of thousands of soldiers.

By the time of the rise of Islam in the 600s, Balochistan was loosely controlled by the Sassanid Persian empire, but as that empire faced the onslaught of the Arabs, Balochistan, then known as Makran (after the name of its coastal region), passed to the control of the Rai Dynasty of Sindh. The Arabs defeated this dynasty in 644 at the Battle of Rasil and conquered Makran, which converted to Islam but continued to remain a lightly populated, peripheral region.

In the 11th century, the Seljuk Turks invaded Persia. This is thought to have stimulated the eastward migration of the nomadic tribes (ancestors of today’s Baloch) of central Iran and the area south of the Caspian Sea into Balochistan. As these tribes were used to living marginally in arid territory, the move to the even more arid Balochistan was not a catastrophe and was indeed a path of less resistance than fighting the invaders, who competed for the same pasture space in Iran. Around the same time, Balochistan’s largest minority group, the Brahui (who speak a Dravidian language like other South Indian languages) migrated to Balochistan from central India and formed a symbiotic relationship with the Baloch. Many Baloch become sedentary during this period, farming oases. They formed many kingdoms and tribal confederations, sometimes independent, sometimes under the suzerainty of external empires.

In the 1500s, Balochistan, like Afghanistan to its north, became divided into zones of control between the Safavid Persian Empire to its west and the Mughal Empire to its east. This approximately reflects the Iran-Pakistan border today. Because Persia’s Sistan province is a frontier province, it was loosely controlled and its people had leverage over its central government (they could swear allegiance to the Mughals if they wished). As a result, unlike most of the rest of Iran, it managed to escape the central government’s policy of implementing Shia Islam. As for the Mughals, while initially they ruled Balochistan directly from Multan in the Punjab (in today’s Pakistan), it was never a place of much importance. Control was delegated to a local vassal who organized the Khanate of Kalat in 1666 (located in central Balochistan). On behalf of the Mughals, Kalat ruled over the vassals of the states of Las Bela, Kharan, and Makran, which make up most of Pakistani Balochistan. In 1783, the Khan of Kalat granted suzerainty to the port of Gwadar to a man who later became the Sultan of Oman and who decided to keep it as part of his domains. Pakistan had to buy it back from Oman in 1958.

The division of Balochistan into western and eastern halves temporary lapsed during the 18th century as first the Safavid and then the Mughal Empire, and finally the brief empire of Nader Shah collapsed. Balochistan reverted to a collection of principalities, some of which then fell under the control of Afghanistan, but most remained independent. The most important of these independent principalities was Kalat. Within a century, though, the Qajar dynasty established itself in Persia, and the British in India, squeezing the Baloch again. The British attacked Kalat in 1839 as part of their related invasion of Afghanistan, installing a friendly ruler. In 1854, Kalat became an associated state of the British, and in 1877 the British established the Baluchistan Agency to deal with the Baluch princely states in its Indian Empire and directly rule of the northern half of Balochistan, including Quetta.

In the meanwhile, Persia re-conquered western Balochistan, which has remained part of Iran ever since except for a brief period in the 1920s when it acquired its own “king.” The British and Persians demarcated the boundary between their territories in 1871-1872, with some changes made in 1895-1896. Pakistan, which absorbed the princely state of Kalat in 1955 (allegedly Kalat had tried to find a way to join India instead), reconfirmed this boundary with Iran with some very minor changes during a demarcation in 1958-1959.

These agreements basically established the modern frontier between Iran and Pakistani Balochistan, but it is not an arbitrary division that suddenly severed the Baloch nation in two. The control of the western part of Balochistan from Iran and the eastern from the subcontinent has been a fact more or less for over five centuries, and its current division, based on the Anglo-Persian division represented zones of existing control on the ground rather than an unenforceable, random line. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that ethnic Baloch on both sides of the frontier are getting the short end of the stick, because their needs are subordinated to the needs of their states, but unlike the Pashtun and Kurds, they have neither the numbers nor the firepower to seriously contest this and negotiate further rights.

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Akhilesh Pillalamarri is an international relations analyst.

Courtesy: The Diplomat (Published on Feb 12 2016)

(The author has expressed his personal views)  

The post A Brief History of Balochistan first appeared on Sindh Courier.

Nazir Shakir Brahui

The Pakistan’s province of Balochistan spread over 347,190 sq. km. covers 43.6% of the land area of the country. It has 38 districts and is home to three major ethnic groups: the Brahuis (who are considered Baloch by the Baloch politicians), the Pashtuns, and the Balochis. Although, the ancient Brahui country or state is called “Brahuistan”, putting the name of Brahui country on a side, the province was named as “Balochistan” for political interests.

The word “Balochistan” was first coined by Zaheer-ud-din Babar, Mughal King, during 1526-30 AD for the dera jaat area of Punjab where a large number of Baloch people inhabited. This is explained by Prof. Muhammad Ashraf Qaisrani on page 86 of his book.

The Brahuis call their country “Mash” (mountain), and “Brahuistan”. The Presence of Brahuis in the central Balochistan divided the Balochis into two lingual groups – Sulaimani and Makrani. If these two groups meet each other, they do not understand Balochi language of one another therefore they communicate in Urdu.

The Baloch of Kachhi were under the political influence of Kalhora rulers of Sindh before 1733 when Miyan Noor Muhammad Kalhoro martyred the famous Brahui ruler and Hero Abdullah Khan along with his 700 brave soldiers in 1733. When Nadir Shah Afshar ceded the Kachhi area to Muhabbat Khan Brahui (Son of Abdullah Khan), all the Baloch tribes became under the political power of Brahui state for the first time. The eminent Brahui ruler The Great Naseer Khan Noori enlisted the Baloch in the Brahui army. He did not form any separate military brigade for them but kept the Baloch under the Brahui chiefs.

On November 13, 1839, the British captured the Brahui state and martyred the Brahui ruler Mir Mehrab Khan II along with hundreds of his associates. Then the British government started to appoint the rulers on of Brahui state by its choice. With the help of these new rulers, and under a conspiracy, the British government acquired the territories on lease, including Sibi, Harnai, Pishin, Chaman, Zhob, Loralai, Mari, Bugti, Khetran, Quetta, Bolan and others. These areas were officially renamed as “British Balochistan” by the British on November 1, 1887. The British gave this name to keep the Baloch happy because at that time the British were fighting the Cold War over the occupation of hot water with Russia and Afghanistan. The Baloch were pro Russia and Afghanistan and had close political, intellectual and armed dealings with them. While the Brahuis were associated with the “Reshmi Rumal Movement”.

Russia was using the Baloch for its own interests. The British, therefore, appeased the Baloch politically by renaming the areas leased from the Brahui ruler as “British Balochistan” in order to thwart Russia’s objectives and to liberate the Baloch political and armed struggle against them. Many Britain intelligence agents in their intelligence reports, expressed their displeasure and resentment over the naming of “British Balochistan” and suggested the name “Brahuistan” instead of this name. J. Fredrick Bane writes in his confidential report that “In Baluchistan, powerful, and influential element is not the Baloch at all, but the still unfathomed Brahui, from which circumstance it has even been suggested that the country ought rather to be called Brahuistan”. Similarly, A.H. Keane wrote in his confidential report that “Hence the term Baluchistan, unknown in the country itself, is altogether inappropriate, though it may now be to let to substitute the expression Brahuistan as some”.

The census reports also show that the Brahui were in majority and the Baloch in minority. In the 1901 linguistic census, the number of Brahuis was 292879 and the Baloch were 80552. The census reports of 1922 and 1931 also show that Brahuis were in the majority.

In 1931 many political organizations were formed in the Brahui state in the name of various development terms. These included “Qalat National Party”,”Anjuman-e-Itehad Balochan” and   others. In these political organizations, Brahui and Baloch were waging political struggle together. But Yousuf Aziz Magsi urged the Brahui youth political workers to wage political struggle only in the name of Baloch so that we both, Brahui and Baloch can emerge as a major political force by becoming Baloch only. The Brahui political youth came to this sense. Unlike the “Anjuman-e-Ithad-e-Balochistan” Yousuf Aziz Magsi founded only the “Anjuman-e-Ithad Balochan” in Mastung 1930. This organization gave the political thought of “Greater Balochistan” within Balochistan. In order to bring this political plan to fruition, the activists of the organization created a map of “Greater Balochistan” and made it public. All the armed and nationalist political organizations that are going on inside Balochistan today are following the same political slogan and political interest of the same organization and using the Brahui political activists for their own political gains.

Since the inception of this organization, almost three Brahui generations have lost their status by sacrificing their Brahui history, culture and national identity in the name of Baloch. Baloch politicians and writers have always and in every era, for their own political interests, come up with political slogans and historical assumptions to declare the Brahui as Baloch. In 1930, the political slogan of this political organization was that ‘if we, the Brahuis and Baloch, do not get along’, the Pashtun would hold the majority and our political, economic, linguistic status will fade.

In 1972, in order to prove that the Brahuis are Baloch, the slogan was used that if there is any voice of separating the Brahui from the Baloch, he should be branded as British agent because the British had declared Brahui and Baloch as separate nations on the basis of language.

Since 2006, the Balochis introduced another theory for Brahui political activists to prove them Baloch by saying ‘Brahui is not a nation separate from itself, but is only a language of the Baloch nation.’ Now this slogan is echoing in the political atmosphere of Balochistan. The Baloch consider Brahuis as Baloch for their political interests. Former Balochistan Home Minister Sarfraz Bugti and BNP (M) head Sardar Akhter Mengal had a political tussle on twitter in which Sarfraz Bugti branded Akhter Mengal as unoriginal or fake Baloch. Similarly, the Baloch of Makran do not like the Brahuis, and do not allow them to trade in their area along Iran borders.

On November 28, 1969 the Military President Gen. Yahya ended the one unit and thus under presidential order No. of 1970 province of west Pakistan (Dissolution) the four provinces of Pakistan were declared as East Pakistan, Sindh, Punjab, NWFP (now KPK) and Balochistan. In this process, the ‘provinces of Brahui state’ were officially named “Balochistan” for the first time instead of “Brahuistan”.

All the world linguists and historians agree that Balochs are linguistically and ethnically Indo-Europeans. They set foot in the geographical parts of present day Pakistan in 1200 AD as refugees in Makran. The Brahui language and its speakers with their own national name “Brahui” is 6000 years old. They laid the foundation of Mehrgarh and Indus civilization. It should have happened that the Balochs had to become Brahuis in the Brahui state but the unassuming Brahuis sacrificed their majority, historical heritage, race, culture and conservatism because of the ‘political interests’ of the Baloch. The Balochs, in order to claim themselves as the real heirs of Balochistan, are bringing forward unhistorical, irrational, without facts, proofs to nationalist generation in modern Balochistan, which is emerging in the context of these fabricated writings. This generation is emerging as a tenacious tree only in the shadow of hallow political and emotional nationalism instead of doing great work in the field of science or education which is detrimental to the culture of Balochistan, and the nations living in it. The result is what we see as an emotional and armed struggle.

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Nazir Shakir Brahui, based in Taluka Garhi Yasin, District Shikarpur, Sindh, is a researcher in Sindhi and Brahui languages. His area of interest is Linguistics, Anthropology, History, Archaeology, and Lexicography. He is Member of ‘Brahui Language in Pakistan: International School of Dravidian Linguistics’. Author of five books and several articles, Nazir Shakir has also founded Brahui Research Institute.  For further information, he can be approached at email brahui5000@gmail.com, nshakir@brahui.org and visit www.brahui.org

[The author has expressed his personal views, which do not reflect the editorial policy of Sindh Courier]

The post How Balochistan was named after Balochis? first appeared on Sindh Courier.

By Scott Erich

Above my desk in Muscat, a large classroom map of Asia hangs from two brass rivets. It’s an old map — yellowed, crinkled, and creased where it was once folded and kept in a teacher’s desk. While there’s no date listed on the map, it’s from sometime in the interwar years: in West Asia, the former Ottoman Empire is a patchwork of dotted lines and striped colonial holdings; in East Asia, the Japanese Empire includes the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan.

Oman is an amorphous green blob on the map encompassing the entire eastern coastal Arabian Peninsula, including what are now the Emirates and Qatar. To the west, it bounds up against the no-man’s land of “Great Arabian Desert.” Saudi Arabia had not yet formed — it’s labeled as the disparate regions of the Hejaz, Najd, Asir and Hasa — so the map must be from sometime before 1932, the year the Kingdom was united.

Looking north from Muscat’s shores across the Gulf of Oman, a smaller green blob is marked Gwadar (to Oman). Bright red political boundaries separate the city from its surroundings: the enormous expanse of British colonial India, which stretched from present-day Pakistan to Burma. The exclave of Gwadar lies due west of Karachi on the Makran coast of Pakistan, but on the map it is marked as being within Balochistan, one of three major regions delineated within in British India along with Nepal and Bhutan. But unlike Nepal and Bhutan, Balochistan never gained independence, and the local government remained a client-state of the Raj until partition in 1947, when it was incorporated into Pakistan.

The delineations of Balochistan and Oman’s possession of Gwadar are part of what attracted me to this map when I found it several years ago. People from Balochistan, or Balushis as they’re called here, form a large segment of the modern Sultanate’s society ­­— some estimate as much as 35 percent of Oman’s population is Balushi, although most academics place the number at 15 percent. Omani Sultans owned the port of Gwadar for hundreds of years before eventually selling it to Pakistan for 5 million rupees in 1958. As with East Africa and southern Iran, ties between Balochistan and Oman predate the political link in the “golden age” of Oman’s overseas territories, and extend beyond the breakage of this link into the present day.

Like Pashtuns, Kurds, or Ghurkas, Balochis are often reduced to simplistic stereotypes as warriors and ardent defenders of their provincial homelands. Tenth century Arab geographers Al Muqaddasi and Ibn Hauqal called them a “bellicose and rapacious race of bandits,” having “no propensity whatsoever towards goodness; they have… stony hearts, fierceness, and hardness.” In the epic Shahnameh, medieval Persian poet Ferdowsi mentions Baloch multiple times as mercenaries of Sassanian kings.

Seven hundred years after these accounts, in the time of transition between the Omani Imamate dynasty that preceded the (present) Al Busaidi Sultanate, Imam Seif bin Sultan employed hundreds of Balochis to repel and displace enemies throughout the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, considering them “brave and well-armed with matchlocks.” At the end of the 18th century and early years of the Al Busaidi dynasty, would-be sultan Seyyid Sultan bin Ahmed fled to the then-backwater fishing village of Gwadar after a power struggle in Muscat. He remained in Gwadar for eight years as guest of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Nasir Khan Baloch, who allowed the exiled Omani royal to collect all revenue from the port. Then, in 1792, Seyyid Sultan made a triumphant return to Muscat as sultan, and kept Gwadar as his fortified dominion, reasoning that the Khan of Kalat’s initial gesture of hospitality was intended as a permanent gift.

After his death, Seyyid Sultan’s son Said bin Sultan inherited the throne and capitalized on the possession of Gwadar to equip the Sultanate with steady stream of Baloch fighters. “Said the Great” and his successors used these loyal mercenaries to consolidate power both in Oman and abroad. When Sultan Said moved his capital to Zanzibar, he was accompanied by Baloch soldiers who were sent to posts throughout East Africa to enforce the rule of local Omani governors. Back in Oman, Balochis guarded the strategically placed forts of the Sultan’s walis from warring tribes of the Omani hinterlands.

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the British kept an eye on Gwadar, appointing a resident Political Agent to maintain relations with the Sultan’s governor and represent England’s financial interests in the port. They found a sympathetic ear in Sultan Said bin Taimur, who inherited a nearly ungovernable kingdom from his father who abdicated in 1932 and self-exiled to Bombay and later Karachi. Before partition, the British pondered how they might return Gwadar to their subject, Khan of Kalat, although these efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful. Then, in advance an official visit of Said bin Taimur to London in 1958, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd resolved to wrestle the port from Oman once and for all, saying, “We must tackle [the Sultan] on Gwadur & Buraimi” in a cabinet meeting. The Sultan capitulated and sold the port to Pakistan in September of that year, with a rumored caveat that he would be able to continue to collect Balochis as recruits for the Oman’s military.

“The first modern organized army unit in Oman was entirely [Baloch] in composition,” writes J.E. Peterson, a scholar of Oman’s history.

The Muscat Levy Corps, as it was called, was created in 1921 and became the genesis of the Sultan’s Armed Forces. This unit, along with the Trucial Oman Levies, was integral to the British-backed Sultan’s victory over the Imam of the interior in the Jebel Akhdar war of the 1950s. British officers were tasked with training “boatloads of recruits from Gwadar” brought to camps at the foot of Jebel Akhdar, or “Green Mountain,” the Imam’s last stronghold.

In 1964 the Sultan’s Armed Forces were over 60 percent Baloch, and recruitment increased leading up to and during the Dhofar War in Oman’s southern province, which stretched throughout the 1960s and 70s. After the war, Balochis who fought for the Sultan remained and settled in Oman, blending into Omani society like so many merchants, traders, slaves, and soldiers before them.

Today, Balushi-Omanis maintain a strong presence in the security industry as soldiers, policemen, Ministry of Defense employees, and security guards. Many of the top officers in each military branch have Balushi heritage, like Major General Matar bin Salim bin Rashid al-Balushi, Commander of the Royal Army of Oman and Rear Admiral Abdullah bin Khamis al Raisi, Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman. A Facebook search of the surname “al Balushi” in Oman yields hundreds of profiles with public listings of jobs at the Royal Oman Police, the Royal Air Force of Oman, the Royal Cavalry, and so on. And the practice continues: as recent as 2014, the Omani government accepted applications to join the military from youth in coastal Balochistan.

Importantly, Balushi-Omanis are far more than just soldiers. Like any other group in Oman, they come from regionally and economically diverse backgrounds. On one hand, some of the most prominent businessmen in construction, manufacturing, and retail are of Balushi origin.

One of His Majesty’s top economic advisors, Muhammad Al Zubair, is a grandson of Baloch merchant Ali Al Hooti, who also advised two of Said the Great’s successors: Omani Sultan Turki bin Said and Zanzibari Sultan Barghash bin Said. The Zubair Corporation is one of the largest private companies in Oman, with massive holdings in real estate, construction, hospitality, and retail. Bait Al Zubair, the merchant family’s former home in Old Muscat, is now an impressive museum dedicated to Omani history and cultural heritage. On the other hand, many Balushi-Omanis work in professions considered to be at the lower echelons of Omani society like fishing, taxi driving, and truck driving. Since I’ve been in Muscat, several non-Balushis have shared well-worn stereotypes with me about accents, drug use, and insularity in these lower-income Balushi communities.

It would be easy for the uninitiated to visit Muscat and remain unaware of Balushi history or presence — but the signs would be all around them. Muscat’s largest and most popular tourist souq is in a historically Balushi neighborhood, and it’s not uncommon to hear Balushi-Omani shopkeepers speak to their migrant worker employees in Urdu, their shared lingua franca. In addition, many of the “traditional Omani” wares that are sold in the souq are of Baloch provenance — namely the much of the jewelry, hats, and elaborately embroidered women’s garments. Elsewhere, in the few bookstores that remain in Muscat, another sign jumps out at speakers of Arabic: political tracts on Baloch independence.

For obvious reasons, political writing of any kind is rare in Oman, particularly that which might be perceived as divisive or inflammatory. So you can imagine my surprise that several books on Baloch liberation are readily available at Borders and at semi-annual book fairs. With titles like The Baloch Awakening: Essays on the Baloch Question, The Baloch Question: Background and Contemporary Developments, and Baloch Nationalism: It’s Origin and Development, the books are Arabic translations by diaspora Baloch (including at least two Balushi-Omanis), and are rigorous, unapologetic treatises by activist-writers in support of a free Balochistan. Though the Omani government has an official policy of condemning violent movements of all kinds, the condoning of the sale of these books within the Sultanate is an interesting wrinkle in an otherwise no-tolerance policy.

Oman maintains unshakeable political, economic, and security relationships with Pakistan and Iran — both of whom face simmering separatist movements from a divided Baloch opposition. The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and Jundullah (PRMI) operate across the Pakistani-Iranian border, while the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) focuses on Pakistan. The current ambassador of Oman to Pakistan is of Baloch heritage and Oman’s top military brass who regularly meet with their Iranian and Pakistani counterparts are also Baloch — signs that may signal Oman’s desire to gently nudge the two countries toward mediation of the Baloch conflict. Importantly, no Balushi-Omani officials have made comments like Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, the Head of General Security for the Emirate of Dubai, who publicly supported a free Iranian Balochistan last November.

Back in Gwadar, a new order is beginning to emerge. The port had already begun to fall into irrelevance before Omani withdrawal in the late 1950s, and sunk further into poverty for the remainder of the 20th century. Just as Omani and British eyes once looked to Gwadar as a strategic trade point, so now are the Chinese hinging their New Silk Road project on the remote port, once called “the most important city you’ve never heard of” by the New York Post.

China began developing the port in the early 2000’s but pulled out after their engineers were kidnapped and killed by Baloch separatists. After assurances from the Pakistani government, the Chinese came roaring back, securing a 40-year, US$46 billion contract to make Gwadar a western gateway for China to the rest of the world. The planned China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will connect China’s Xinjiang with Pakistan by rail, road, and pipeline through the Khunjerab pass and down the length of Pakistan to Gwadar. From there, China will be able to bypass the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca to export/import to/from other nascent projects for the new “Maritime Silk Road,” like the ports of Bagamoyo in Tanzania, and Duqm in southern Oman.

Still, fears loom about the threat of Baloch independence movements ruining China’s ambitions. But hard power isn’t the only tactic being used by Baloch nationalists to try and stall the project. In 2012, when the Chinese were beginning to restart the project, Balochistan province’s Chief Minister Aslam Raisani announced plans to gift 200 acres of land in Gwadar to His Majesty Sultan Qaboos as a “goodwill gesture.” The “government-to-government relationship is fine, but we want to revive the Balochi-Omani bond,” a retired official said on Chief Minister Raisani’s behalf. An American-based Baloch nationalist organization went one step further, and wrote a direct appeal to His Majesty, which was delivered to his representative in Washington Ambassador Hunaina Al Mughairy.

“Baloch loyalty to Oman is no secret as thousands of Baloch have laid down their lives in the defense of the Sultanate of Oman,” the letter read. After describing how the port project was initiated against the will of Balochis, it urged Oman to intervene in any way possible. This even included having the Sultanate claim “legal ownership over the historic port, as [we] have full faith in the government of Oman.” If His Majesty the Sultan should choose to entertain this request, a number of “Baloch freedom leaders” living in exile were listed as contacts. The first one is His Royal Highness the Khan of Kalat. Perhaps his forefather meant for Gwadar to be a permanent gift after all.

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Courtesy: Institute of Current World Affairs (Article was published on March 9, 2016)

The post Soldiers and Sultans between Balochistan and Oman first appeared on Sindh Courier.

By Kriti M. Shah

Economic vs political motivation

Historical circumstances and social organization of the Pashtun and Baloch have propelled their members along different routes to mobilization. As Paul Titus highlights, neither route is entirely exclusive of the other. In post-colonial Balochistan, the Baloch have followed a predominantly political route while Pashtun have followed an economic route to mobilization.

The Baloch’s mobilization has been of a political nature primarily due to the institution of the sardar in Baloch society and its tendency to create dynamic leaders at an ethnic-national level. Through the years a number of sardars have entered politics, aiming to convert their tribal standing into political power. There has been no sincere effort or political will on the part of the British or the Pakistan state to change or curb the power of the sardar. As a sardar’s main interest remained in consolidating their land, the British focused on buying their loyalty, making them extensions of British authority in their particular region. This gave the British and later the Pakistan state indirect access over the natural resources in their territory. As the leader of his tribe, the sardar often acted against the interests of his people, accepting British financial assistance in exchange for submission to their authority. This policy has not only strengthened the sardari system over the years, it also inhibited the growth of pan-Sardar solidarity. Different Baloch leaders have set up tribal guerrillas and fighters in their territory, first to help the British, then to fight Pakistan over the years. Bugti, Mengal and Marri—the principal tribal chiefs in open rebellion against the government—are highly suspicious of each other.  They have all led forces of thousands of loyalists: the Marri tribe formed the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA); Attaluah Mengal, leader of the Baloch National movement or BNM, which merged into the BNP; and the Jamhoori Wattan Party which has ties to the Bugti tribe. The leaders have remained divided across the political ideological spectrum, on how to deal with the Pakistan state. During the 1990 interim elections, Bugti split from the BNA, forming the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) which made an alliance with Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League. This has been a trend ever since, of factional rivalries leading to Baloch groups making alliances with national parties. In 1991, Mengal and the BNP formed a coalition with support of the PPP and in 1996 Zulfikar Magsi formed a government with support of PPP, PMLN and JUI. In 2010, after political lobbying and much struggle, the 18th amendment of the Pakistan Constitution was passed under the PPP government, whereby NWFP was renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), in an effort to assuage the Pashtuns. It comprised seven agencies and 28 districts, and the tribal areas of FATA were left as they were.

Baloch ethnic identity gained greater importance in the post-colonial era because of resource competition with the Pashtuns. While this is partly because of the influx of Pashtun refugees fleeing the war in Afghanistan, it is important to recognize the legacy of the colonial era. While Balochistan remained poorer than any Pakistan region, the northern Pashtun areas achieved a greater deal of economic progress. This is partly due to the British construction of road and railway routes through the frontier region towards Afghanistan. As trade and troops flowed through the new routes, larger population centers grew. While there was economic development and new towns were being built along the railway lines in the south as well, the colonial development of the region favored the Pashtun population in the north, more than the Baloch in the south. In the Pashtun areas of Balochistan, there is evidence of economic success. Straddled across the Durand Line, Pashtuns have for generations controlled important trade and smuggling routes. Relative to the Baloch, they have been successful in professions such as transportation and construction. Given their historical ties to various regimes in northern India, the Pashtuns have developed networks and skills that have given them access to economic markets in Pakistan.

The Baloch have felt a strong sense of political deprivation, due to their under-representation and underemployment at the federal level. They have felt much more alienated from the Punjabi establishment than have the Pashtuns. The perception is that the Punjabis, who dominate the state apparatus and representative institutions like the military and civil bureaucracy, look down on them as “primitive”, while favoring the Pashtuns. Historically, the bulk of the Pakistan army has comprised Punjabis (70-75 percent), Pashtun (15-21 percent), with a small proportion of Sindhis and Mohajirs (3-5 percent) and Baloch (0.3 percent). In addition, Pashtuns are well represented in all strata of the capitalist class, having established businesses in all provinces; in contrast, there is no significant Baloch capitalist class.

Conclusion

There is an oft-quoted way of describing the British colonialists’ approach to the historical ethnic tapestry in what is now Pakistan: “Rule the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pashtun and befriend the Baloch.” While it may have been a truism of how the British empire viewed the region, it also encapsulates the way the nation-state that is Pakistan has chosen to deal with the different ethnic groups within its territory.

Security experts are keeping a watchful eye on Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan, given the potential for conflict in the region. After all, the tribal systems and culture of the Pashtuns of FATA have been irrevocably damaged, they continue to be economically deprived, and the military forces have them in a choke-hold. The Pashtuns are left with few options. The loss of their homes, families, traditions and normalcy has not only pushed Pashtun society even further backwards, but has left them with no trust in the Pakistan government. External pressure on the tribal leaders has had no effect that is remotely beneficial to the state. It has instead forced the Pashtuns to take up arms, first against Pakistan’s enemies in Afghanistan and then against Pakistan itself. The rise and growth of the PTM threatens the Pakistan state, given its non-violent and democratic nature. It will take Pakistan nothing less than urgent, far-reaching steps to make amends for decades of brutality against the Pashtuns: restoration of the tribal structures; removal of arbitrary checkpoints; a return of those who have been taken by state forces without a trace; and a cessation of the military policy in the region.

In Balochistan, while the Baloch leaders make alliances for their own political and financial benefit, the people of the province are suffering and continue to be repressed. There is minimal representation of the people and there is a need for a drastic political change that takes into account the voices on the ground. Intra-Baloch rivalry, compounded by the paranoia of its leaders, has stunted Baloch politics. While the potential of a pan-Baloch party cannot be ruled out, the military’s meddling in electoral politics dampens hopes of real change in the grassroots. As projects under CPEC continue, there is the potential for a grassroots movement similar to PTM to emerge that will fight for adequate and fair representation in the government and development projects in the province.

The PTM continues to grow—battling state repression and the persecution and killing of its leaders—and carries the Pashtuns’ historical baggage. The Baloch and the Pashtun share a common history given injustices they have suffered in the hands of the Pakistan state. The demands of the nationalists have shifted from separatism (or calls for Pashtunishtan and Greater Balochistan) to working within the democratic system for fairer treatment and restoration of their fundamental rights. Non-violent, grassroots and non-political movements such as the PTM offer hopes of possible future cooperation between the Pashtun and Baloch people, to come together and assert their demands for their constitutional and human rights.

(Concludes)

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About the Author

Kriti M. Shah is an Associate Fellow in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Observer Research Foundation. Her research primarily focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where she studies their domestic politics as well as their relationship with each other, the Taliban, the United States and the larger South Asian neighborhood. Her other areas of interest include the role of technology in fighting terrorism in Kashmir and the ongoing Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and its dynamic and tumultuous relationship with the Pakistani state. Prior to joining ORF, she worked as reporter for NDTV. She is a graduate of McGill University in Montreal, Canada.

Courtesy: Observer Research Foundation

The post The Baloch and Pashtun nationalist movements in Pakistan – VI first appeared on Sindh Courier.

Pakistan’s ethno nationalists have all demanded greater political, economic and cultural autonomy for their group and region.

By Kriti M. Shah

Pashtun and Baloch Paths to Mobilization

The Pashtun and Baloch nationalist movements have evolved, and continue to do so, influenced both by the domestic environment and the role of external political actors in the region. While there is economic activity in Balochistan—development projects are being undertaken and investments are pouring in— the people do not receive the direct benefits of such developments. There has also been no political reform and the Balochs continue to lack representation in the decision-making mechanisms. The leaders are widely viewed as being disengaged, unreliable and malleable, forcing the burgeoning middle class to assert themselves free from the clutches of the sardari system. This middle class, driven by the legacy of past generations, finds itself part of the Baloch nationalist movement amidst the industrialization and urbanization being facilitated by CPEC. They are demanding their rights and claiming their stakes on the economic development of their province.

In the case of the Pashtuns, the PTM has become an unprecedented national movement. The leaders of PTM initially mobilized action on the historical problems of underdevelopment, neglect and discrimination. As the Pakistan military sought to bring down the PTM, there have been numerous reports of human rights violations being committed against the Pashtuns. Indeed, following the Soviet jihad and especially as a result of policies set down by the US and Pakistan after 9/11, the Pashtuns have found themselves associated with the Taliban, terrorism and militancy. For those who do have ideological sympathy for the Talban it is because of aspects of Pashtunwali (that dictates hospitality and safety for guests, that may be in this case, militants from Afghanistan who had fled into the tribal areas) and as a consequence of US operations and Pakistan military campaigns in the region. The movement, therefore, represents the Pashtuns’ fight for their constitutional rights. The fact that the PTM is non-violent is in stark contrast to the number of Baloch rebellions which have advocated violence against state instruments.

While Pashtuns and Baloch have had a similar history and experience with regards to atrocities committed against them by the state, their movements have taken different paths. This section seeks to understand the different underlying themes of nationalism, religion and political and economic representation that must inform any analysis of the two movements.

Islamism vs nationalism

From Ayub Khan to Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s army elite has tried to forcefully promote a united country, favoring military action over political solutions to squash any separatist tendencies. Such a policy has only reinforced these sentiments. Former President Zia-ul-Haq was once quoted as saying he would “ideally like to break up the existing provinces and replace them with fifty-three small provinces, erasing ethnic identities from the map of Pakistan all together”.

As Urdu was linked to the ideology of Muslim separatism and was projected as a major symbol for national integration, it made language an identity symbol for ethno-nationalists. Ethnic groups in East Pakistan, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP have reacted by consolidating their identity, of which language is a defining aspect.

The Bengali and Sindhi language movements have been violent. The ethnic tensions between the Urdu-speaking Mohajir and Sindhi speakers—manifesting in language riots and the splitting of Sindh’s provincial quota into Urban and Rural in 1972-73—planted the seeds for the creation of the political party, Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in the 1980s. While groups have asserted their ethnic identity in the form of language, the Pashtun have been different. The Pashto language movement has decreased in intensity because the Pashtuns have integrated themselves in the mainstream to a certain degree, joining the army and bureaucracy in fairly large numbers.

The division of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh in 1971 shattered the myth that being Muslim was enough to unite the nation. Despite that, leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, and Zia in the 1980s continued the policy of sectarianism and “divide and rule”. Rather than creating a national consciousness, however, the aggressive promotion of the Urdu language and Muslim identity became one of the major causes of the “Talibanisation” of the western border; it would drive the security establishment’s obsession with being anti-India. The Pakistan state’s quest for homogeneity created further faultlines within society and contributed to the emergence of radical Islamic groups across the country.

Pakistan’s ethno nationalists have all demanded greater political, economic and cultural autonomy for their group and region. Pashtun nationalists have tried to unite people on a more inclusive basis than tribalism. The call to create an independent Pashtun homeland (Pashtunistan) for all Pashtuns irrespective of tribal affiliations/ groupings and including Pashtuns from both sides of the Durand Line, had been a persistent feature of their politics, although it had since declined. While parties such as the ANP, which represents Pashtun interests, and the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party or PMAP (which represents Pashtuns in Balochistan) have amassed support, their ability to form government has been controlled by other groups such as JUI (Islamic party) and other national parties. This is similar to 1947 when the Muslim League or the idea of a nation based on Islam, overwhelmed Gaffar Khan’s movement to create a Pashtun country.

During the Afghan jihad, with the proliferation of madrassas, Islamists wanted to change the local Pashtun population’s tribal affiliation into religious affiliations, as Islam was the ‘tool’ used to fight the Soviets. Militants targeted tribal Maliks, resulting in the collapse of the traditional tribal system. By eliminating the most powerful tribal leaders, the mullahs filled the political vacuum by providing religious motivation to the militants.

The British policy towards the Pashtun rested on identifying and ranking tribes in relation to one another, to determine which group was most strategically important over which region, and which sub-tribes relied on them, allocating allowances and subsidies on this basis. Years later, Pakistan identified Pashtuns and tribes based on whether or not they could forge a resistance to the Soviet invasion. By investing in the “idea of the tribe”, the military designed policies where Pashtun were motivated by religion and directed by tribal, cultural and religious principles. Although FATA was severely underdeveloped even before the rise of militancy, the decades of government neglect, archaic FCR laws and lack of investment in the region allowed a black economy and violence to flourish. As a result, military campaigns in the region after 2001 left residents more vulnerable to militant recruitment. While the government could have won over people’s hearts and minds and curbed extremism through institutional, political and economic changes to governance, it chose instead to empower those that would do its bidding and further alienate majority of the population. Therefore, while jihad initially helped suppress the Pashtun sentiments in the larger cause of jihad, it did not eliminate them. The PTM is a prime example of how ethnic nationalism in Pakistan continues to evolve today. The destruction of the tribal structures as a result of religious indoctrination and military campaigns has caused Pashtuns to seek a reversal of their fortunes and return to a time where their lives were governed by their tribal customs.

In Balochistan, the Pakistan government continues through the Ministry of Religious Affairs to set up madrassas to penetrate deeper into the Baloch areas that are opposed to the mullah. By harnessing the growing power of the clergy, they have manipulated elections, enabling religious parties such as Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) to form the government. The rationale behind this policy is two-fold: the state assumes that this is the best way to entrench Islamic thought into society, ingrain it among the Baloch so as to subdue their nationalist and separatist aspirations; the second is to propagate a disinformation campaign that equates Baloch resistance with Islamic terrorism. Pakistan intelligence services have linked nationalist militarism in the state to the terrorism of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, while ironically Baloch insurgents taking refuge in Afghanistan, sided with communist forces.

(Continues)

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About the Author

Kriti M. Shah is an Associate Fellow in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Observer Research Foundation. Her research primarily focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where she studies their domestic politics as well as their relationship with each other, the Taliban, the United States and the larger South Asian neighborhood. Her other areas of interest include the role of technology in fighting terrorism in Kashmir and the ongoing Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and its dynamic and tumultuous relationship with the Pakistani state. Prior to joining ORF, she worked as reporter for NDTV. She is a graduate of McGill University in Montreal, Canada.

Courtesy: Observer Research Foundation

The post The Baloch and Pashtun nationalist movements in Pakistan – V first appeared on Sindh Courier.

By Kriti M. Shah

Baloch tribes developed a sardar system in the early 15th century. The sardar would pledge loyalty to the Baloch Khan of Kalat and promise to defend the Khan’s kingdom against any outside attack. The position of the sardar was a crucial feature of membership in a Baloch tribe, and the ordinary Baloch were resigned to the leadership of the sardar. He was seen as a central and unifying presence, with the power to settle disputes between tribe members. The British would use this system to their advantage and force the Khannate to become a loose federation; over time, it became a ghost of its former self.

The British appointed and bribed leaders amongst the Pashtuns as well. However, the concept of a sardar is absent from Pashtun society, where the main decision-making body is the institution of the jirga. The jirga allows all adult male members of the tribe to collectively make decisions and prevents the concentration of power in a single individual. In such a system, the tribal leaders are accorded their power from within the tribe and not from their relation to the British. It was the opposite case in Balochistan, where support from the British allowed sardars to develop authority within their tribe. This helps to understand how the western frontier would evolve with its integration into Pakistan, and how the Pakistani state would dictate the frontier’s future.

The Khan of Kalat entered into an agreement with the British in 1839 which allowed them to trade and have military movements through Quetta, Bolan and Khojak passes, in return for a INR 50,000 subsidy. Over time, British involvement increased through further treaties, alliances with influential sardars, and military incursions. Within the next few years, the British annexed Sindh (1843) and Punjab (1849), extending their political footprint. The Khan of Kalat was left with no allies.

In 1877, Robert Sandeman was appointed as chief commissioner for the agency of Balochistan. He negotiated a treaty between the colonial government and the Khan of Kalat and his sardars, which allowed the British to consult and construct in the region as well as appoint a British agent to reside in the court of Kalat and settle disputes between the Khan and his sardars. The agreement reaffirmed the status of the Khan as a leader of an independent, albeit subordinate allied state. This helped the British thwart any resistance that grew amongst the local population against the Khan, who was now essentially an ‘agent’ or had at least accepted the growing clout of the British in their homeland. It was under this system that the role of sardars became part of a hierarchical British institution in the state. As the British gave sardars salaries, the fear of being denied money (which they knew would increase their influence within the tribe) forced sardars to follow British orders. In 1883, the British leased Quetta, Marri-Bugti, the Bolan Pass under the name of “British Balochistan”. Except for the Marri-Bugti area, the rest of the British Balochistan region was Pashtun-dominated.

The colonial administration faced a number of social and administrative challenges as a result of their intrusion, despite treaties designed to “keep peace” with the Khan. While they continued to expand with the building of military cantonments, post offices and setting up telegraph and railway lines, the Baloch tribes put up resistance. In the years leading up to the departure of the British and the partition of India, small-scale attacks were conducted by the Baloch tribes, punctuated by a series of uprisings. In 1897, Pashtun warriors attacked British forces across the frontier. Nonetheless, the British laid the foundation for the Balochistan agency, leaving Kalat (which was predominantly Baloch) free of colonial pressure.

On 12 August 1947, two days before the creation of Pakistan, Kalat declared its independence. After the creation of Pakistan, Kalat offered special relations in areas of defence and foreign affairs. Pakistan refused and demanded its integration into the new state. In March 1948, Pakistan annexed the entire region. A speech by Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, a Baloch nationalist in 1947, summed up how the Baloch felt about joining Pakistan: “Pakistani officials are pressuring to join Pakistan, because Balochistan would not be able to sustain itself economically… we have minerals, we have petroleum and ports. The question is where would Pakistan be without us?”

The British policy towards the Pashtun and the Baloch set the foundation for Pakistan’s state policy towards the two ethnic groups. While the Pashtuns were stereotyped as warriors and fighters, they were integrated into the army and allowed to govern themselves under FCR and certain aspects of the Pashtun tribal code. The Baloch were manipulated by coopting their leaders to support the British. Such a policy would continue as the state of Pakistan came into being.

The Role of State Policy

The partition of India in 1947 led to the creation of an ethnically and linguistically diverse Pakistan. While East Pakistan was more culturally and linguistically homogenous, West Pakistan was less so, with five major languages, various dialects, religions, castes and tribal identities. Many groups in Pakistan have similar cultural affiliations with groups outside the borders. The Pashtuns, for example, are also found in eastern Afghanistan, while the Baloch, in southern Afghanistan and Iran.

The state ideology was based on three founding principles: Islam would be the unifying force; Urdu would be the language of the people; and the military would be strengthened to counter “Hindu India”. Instead of establishing institutions that would accord equal rights to the various ethno-linguistic groups, the state projected Islam as their common denominator. The policy exacerbated ethnic divisions in the innately diverse nation; the assertion of any ethno-linguistic identity in the context of seeking political rights was seen as divisive.

Each of these ethnic groups has had a unique path to mobilization. Yet, across all of them, the drivers of ethnic conflict are largely the same: the lack of provincial autonomy; economic exploitation; and political and military oppression.

Lack of Provincial Autonomy

In the first few decades of Pakistan’s existence as a sovereign territory, the politics of the nation was defined by the government’s ‘One Unit’ plan. The scheme involved the integration of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan into a single province of West Pakistan. The aim was to neutralise the Bengali majority in East Pakistan. It was strongly opposed by the people of NWFP, Balochistan and Sindh. By then, the Pashtuns had been coopted by the Pakistani leadership and were either part of mainstream politics or serving in the military and becoming the second largest ethnic group within the army. The One Unit plan thwarted any sort of autonomy for the different ethnic groups. In NWFP, Gaffar Khan led the movement against One Unit, undertaking tours across the tribal region to address rallies and raise ethno-nationalist consciousness against the plan. The Pakistani state naturally saw the Pashtun nationalist leaders as projecting their Pashtun identity above their Islamic identity.

Following Kalat’s annexation in 1948, the Pakistani government announced that it would be treated in the same manner as it was during the British era. This meant the appointment of a political agent, entrusted with the powers to look after the state administration and guide the government on the internal matters of the state. The Baloch strongly resisted Pakistan assertion, seeing them as no different from the British. The government responded by banning political parties in Kalat and arresting the Baloch leadership. Over the years, the government in Islamabad has repeatedly tried to assimilate Baloch identity into the larger Pakistan identity. Since 1947, the state has engaged the Baloch in violent confrontations on five occasions (1948, 1958, 1962, 1973-77 and 2001 onwards).

The One Unit scheme sparked a violent uprising in Balochistan as the policy decreased Baloch representation at the federal level and forestalled the establishment of a provincial assembly, which had yet to be approved by the central government nearly a decade after Partition. The Khan of Kalat mobilized tribal leaders against the scheme which they saw as the federal government’s way of centralizing power and limiting provincial autonomy. The government arrested the Baloch leaders and crushed the revolt. The province continued to be treated like a colony and the central government exploited the resources.

(Continues)

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About the Author

Kriti M. Shah is an Associate Fellow in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Observer Research Foundation. Her research primarily focusses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where she studies their domestic politics as well as their relationship with each other, the Taliban, the United States and the larger South Asian neighborhood. Her other areas of interest include the role of technology in fighting terrorism in Kashmir and the ongoing Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and its dynamic and tumultuous relationship with the Pakistani state. Prior to joining ORF, she worked as reporter for NDTV. She is a graduate of McGill University in Montreal, Canada.

Courtesy: Observer Research Foundation

The post The Baloch and Pashtun nationalist movements in Pakistan – II first appeared on Sindh Courier.