Zaffar Junejo

On the 12th of February 2022, I was at the Miani battlefield. This was the site of the British East India Company’s conquest of Talpur-ruled Sindh, led by Charles Napier.

Now, the area is also famous for floriculture. The winter day ended quickly and the dusk wrapped the flower-covered area. Red roses that shone in the day now looked cherry colored. The sporadic shadows of Babul tresses transitioned the red color of roses into merlot. The sunset brought silence, and darkness rushed to drape the terrain. Back from the rose fields, I saw a tea stall near the Miani War Memorial (Chandian Wari Dhevrri). I went there.

It apparently looked deserted, but I saw a bearer. Perhaps he was the owner. I asked him to bring me a cup of tea. He gave me a cup, and also brought one cup for himself. He was in a mood to converse. So, I started and asked him about the Miani War. He stared at me in confusion, then told me that he only knew one war: “Hekrri Larrae – Sheedeuin Wari” (the battle of Sheedis or African-origin people).

His reply opened new vistas for me to explore. He, however, turned to another topic. He told me that his tea-stall was dependent upon flower-picking laborers. Now the season would be off. Then in a monologue, he said: “Dhandho Shud” (Business Zero). While he was in conversation with me, I noticed that he attentively rolled his emerald stone ring worn on his right hand’s thumb. Just to carry on the conversation, I enquired from him about the benefits of wearing stones. He held the teacup in his hands, and, in earnest, whispered that it was a gift from Egypt, and its holder became brave. He took gutka (betel quid) packed in a tiny plastic bag from the side pocket of his light blue-colored long shirt. He poured a small portion in his mouth, chewed slowly, and cleaned his hands with his unkempt hair. He expected from me that I should utter a few words as the conversation ought to continue. However, I was thinking about the name Sheedian Wari Larrae, which he had used a little earlier. He took my silence as a discouraging gesture and decoded it as an end to the conversation. And so, he quickly stood up and gathered the cups.

“Sheedian Wari Larrae” – this newly learned name of the Miani battle pushed me to ponder over some questions. Were the Talpur rulers even willing to fight? If they were not, then who fought at the Miani battle?

I reached home, and quickly leafed through Qadir Bux Nizamani’s book Jang-e-Miani (Miani’s War). It was published in 1947. It is one of the earlier published books in Sindhi language about the Miani battles. Nizamani has also mentioned that a popular name of the Miani battle is “Khanani Talpurn Wari Jang” (Battle of Khanani Talpurs). He states that none of the Amirs (Talpurs) of Sindh were ready to fight. And so, under the leadership of Mir Jan Muhammad Talpur, some Baloch leaders resolved to fight with the East India Company’s army. Those who decided to fight were: Ghulam Khan Laghari, Ghulam Ali Khan Nizamani, Ghulam Shah Khan Talpur and Mir Jan Muhammad Talpur.

Another historian Rahimdad Molai Shedai in his famous book Janat-ul-Sindh elaborates that Mir Jan Muhammad was the leader of this battle. Other commanders of his lashkar were Mir Ghulam Shah Shahwani, Ibrahim Khan, Syed Abduallah Shah, Moro Chang, Syed Fateh Muhamamd Shah Lakyari, Bahawal Rind, Ghulam Muhammad Khan Laghari and Nawab Ahmed Khan Laghari.

The next day, I contacted Muhib Laghari and Nisar Laghari. Both are residents of Warnki Waski, a village adjacent to the Miani battlefield. They told me that they were the first who started celebrating Miani Day at the battlefield. According to them, some literary and cultural organisations later carried on the tradition and remembered the Miani battle. Muhib Laghari added that till now, locals call it Khanani Talpurn Wari Jang (Battle of Khanani Talpurs). He also endorsed Qadir Bux Nizamani’s point of view that Mir Jan Muhammad Talpur was the initiator of the Miani battle.

“Even until today, the locals remembered Mir Jan Muhammad Khanani Talpur as an architect of the war,” he noted.

On the same day, along with some friends, I went to the common graveyard of the Miani battle. We headed towards the north, crossed some floral beds, and then from a distance I saw a white-colored mosque. Amin Joyo, a young historian, told me that people of nearby villages are of the view that along with the mosque, there was also a well. He added: “It is believed that this place was one of the outposts of the Talpurs, and the mosque and the well were constructed for the convenience of the stationed troops.” Some rose-pickers looked at us from a distance. It was strange that none of them approached us or enquired from us about our presence in the graveyard.

I noticed a middle-aged man draped in a bit loose overcoat – dark brown, made of thick fabric and decorative with wide-shoulder-buckles. But it shouldn’t be compared with Gogol’s short story The Overcoat, which shows the importance of essential material things in one’s life.

He came to the scene and silently followed us. When we were standing in front of Mir Jan Muhammad Talpur’s grave, he broke his silence and in an inaudible tone said: “Mir Jan Muhammad Talpur was the one who fought with Angrez (English people), and Mir Badshah had hidden themselves in their palaces.”

He elaborated that the Mirs’ cowardice instigated the people to send them bangles and ladies’ clothes. When we came out of the graveyard and took the muddy path that zigzagged from the fields, I heard his melodious voice. He was crooning Shaikh Ayaz’s “Vai,” sang by Fakir Abdul Ghafor. The “Vai,” along with Comrade Hyder Baksh Jatoi’s poem “Jeay Sindh, Jeay Sindh,” was a popular song in the anti-One-Unit movement. Now he raised his voice:

Sahando Ker Mayar O’ Yar,

Sindhrri Khe Sir Ker Na Dhendo

(Who among us, my friend, would bear abashing?

Of not sacrificing himself for Sindh, while a call comes?)

I didn’t realize it when he ended his singing; because I was engrossed in thoughts of my initially prepared bibliography about the Miani War.

I believe, roughly, that I have listed four dozen books about the Miani and Duabbo battles, but few books provide first-hand accounts. These books are: Records of the Irregular Horse (Volume 1), The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier (Volume II and Volume III) and Madras Artillery Records (Volume VII).

Generally, it is believed that Sindh was conquered by the British on the 17th of February 1843, and that its defeat was completed on the 24th of March at Duabbo. However, HT Lambrick, in his article “The Sindh Battles, 1843” published by the Sindh Historical Society, has mentioned that the people of Sindh talk of the battle of the 24th of March (Duabbo) as the “Battle of Nareja Goth.” He has also mentioned that the common name of the battle of the 24th March (Duabbo) among locals is “Mir Sher Muhammad Wari Jang” (Mir Sher Muhammad’s Battle).

Now we were on the main path. It snaked onwards, being the only way to reach the metalled road. We were walking in a queue. A man from Chandia village was also walking in front of me. I asked him about the Duabbo Battle. He responded to me with a prelude that the battle was spread over miles and was called “Mir Sher Muhammad Ji Jang” (Mir Sher Muhammad’s Battle). He added: “It is said that lash (dead bodies) were in the thousands, and the wounded hid themselves in the surrounding forests and became prey to wild animals.” Later, the Governor-General’s order allowed the corps to bear the name “Hyderabad, 1843.” The word was to be mentioned in their orders, appointments, colours, and standards. They were also permitted to replace “Meanee” with “Hyderabad.” Nowadays, the Cheshire regiment veterans’ Facebook groups and private websites remember the regiment’s military campaigns and battles. One of their unofficial logos mentions the names of the battles, including Miani and Hyderabad. Some veterans’ groups prepare and sell souvenirs such as badges, table-standards and cups.

Recently published works reveal how the East India Company, a modest business enterprise, under the short period of 100 years (1757-1857) occupied 89,000 square miles out of India’s 157,000 square miles. Professor Dr. Michael H. Fisher’s edited book, The Politics of the British Annexation of India, 1757-1857’has unpacked the East India Company’s annexation process.

He has explained that the Company annexed through manipulation of powerful groups (tribal and feudal chiefs and members of Rajas’ Darbars), criminality, bribes and deception. Mathew A. Cook, in his recently published book Annexation and the Unhappy Valley: The Historical Anthropology of Sindh’s Colonization, has deeply explored the post-annexation phenomena in Sindh. He has highlighted the sociocultural consequences of the annexation.

I am of the view that the East India Company’s annexation process in India, including Sindh, went through two phases. In its first phase, the Company, through its ‘residencies,’ developed military and political relationships with Rajas, Princes and Amirs. In its second phase, it reduced the power of the native states by imposing treaties, then interfering in their affairs.

Sindh’s annexation also went through the same route – exploitation, trickery, threats, agreements and battles. Resultantly, the Amirs of Sindh became weak and fragile; and gradually Sindh was fully annexed – an independent Sindh merged into an existing British polity. Now, historians have replaced the ‘annexation’ phrase with ‘occupation’, ‘battle’ and ‘war.’

Therefore, we may say that the term “Sindh’s annexation” embodies all names and moments: the Miani battle, the Duabbo battle, the Sheedi’s War, the Khanani Talpurs’ War, Sher Muhammad’s War and Hyderabad battle.

All are ways of talking about the fall of Sindh to colonial rule, in 1843.

_____________________

Dr. Zaffar Junejo has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Malaya. His areas of interest are post-colonial history, social history and peasants’ history.

Courtesy: The Friday Times Lahore

The post The fall of Sindh to the Company: A Defeat with Many Names first appeared on Sindh Courier.

The names of Wariyam son of Bachu Badshah and Jiando Wasan nephew of Piru Vizier appeared several times in the correspondence between the Sindh officials and Bombay Presidency. Bachal Alias Bachu Badshah had named his son after his father Wariyam, a warrior who also sacrificed life while fighting the British. His grandson Wariyam too followed the footprints of ancestors and during the resistance war was deported to India in 1915. Similarly, Jiando Wasan was deported two years earlier in 1913.

In 1923, when the Bombay Presidency desired to repatriate some Hurs to Sindh including Wariyam, R. E. Gibson, the then Commissioner of Sindh referring to a letter dated February 07, 1923 from Inspector General of Prisons, Bombay about repatriation of Hurs from Visapur Settlement, suggested vide a letter dated April 12, 1923 that there is no objection to the repatriation of Hurs to Sindh. He, however, suggested that all the Hurs except Wariyam son of Bachu and Mubarak son of Badal should be sent to Sanghar Settlement while these two should report to District Magistrate Nawabshah.

Wariyam was married and by that time he had a daughter. He and his family were to be repatriated. Among other Hurs Mohammad son of Gamu had a wife, two sons and two daughters, Kamil son of Mataro had a wife and Lakhmir son of Bahram had a wife and a daughter while Haroon son of Bahram, Nabi Shah son of Shah Mardan, Dadlo son of Sajan and Durani son of Sumar were single.

Jiando Wasan son of Sajan, who served as schoolmaster at Visapur camp, had applied for repatriation to Sindh on the grounds that his daughter had become of marriageable age and that he was unable to support his family, which consisted of wife, two sons and two daughters out of the pay of Rs.15/- that he got as schoolmaster and Rs.4/-, which are paid to him as doles.

His application was sent to Sindh officials for comments on which the then District Magistrate Nawabshah J. M. Sladen vide letter dated June 23, 1923 informed the Commissioner of sindh that Jiando had satisfactory character since his admission in the Visapur Settlement. “The District Superintendent of Police Nawabshah has no objection to his repatriation to Sindh. Moreover, in view of the fact that Wariyam son of Bachu Badshah has recently been repatriated to Sindh, there should be no objection to the repatriation of Jiando Wasan who is only a nephew of Piru Vizier, especially since he bears a good character at Visapur and he will not be released outright here but kept in Jalalani Agricultural Settlement,” he stated.

The repatriation of Jiando Wasan was in fact recommended by Settlement Officer, Visapur in 1922, as he was reported to be well behaved, but a letter from District Magistrate Nawabshah sent to Inspector General of Prisons, Bombay through Judicial Department of Commissioner of Sindh’s office on July 19, 1923 shows that District Magistrate Tharparkar had objected Jiando Wasan’s repatriation vide letter dated December 18, 1922. On same date the Commissioner of Sindh vide a letter No: 3140-H communicated to Home Department of Bombay the objection and endorsing it. The Assistant Commissioner in Sindh, on behalf of Commissioner, vide letter No:729-H dated May 26, 1923 again informed the Bombay Presidency that Commissioner of Sindh had not recommended the repatriation of Jiando Wasan to Sindh as the District Magistrate Tharparkar was opposed to it even in October 1922.

(Continues)

Click here for Part-I

Click here for Part-II

Click here for Part III

______________________

Excerpts from the prize-winning research-based book ‘Hur – The Freedom Fighter’ authored by Nasir Aijaz (Published by Sindh Culture Department in August 2015)

The post The British savagery against Hur Community in Sindh – Part IV first appeared on Sindh Courier.

Despite imposition of martial law, mass arrests, killings, destruction of villages and a well-hatched conspiracy of disturbing demographic composition of the area by colonization of Bugti tribesmen of Balochistan, Punjabis, Pathans and retired military personnel, granting them thousands of acres of agriculture land in Sanghar and adjoining areas, and clearing a vast area of Makhi forest in a bid to make it unable for Hur militants to use as their hideout, the British failed to suppress the Hur uprising. The then acting Deputy Commissioner Sardar Muhammad Yaqoob, an ill-natured and venomous person from Delhi, whose ancestors were said to be Jews and later converted to Islam, in a report to the Commissioner of Sindh on September 30, 1896 suggested inhuman actions against Hur community including establishing Concentration Camps generally known as ‘Lorrha’, the Hedged Villages, deporting the Hurs to remote Indian states and lodging them in concentration camps there. The term concentration camp refers to a camp in which people are detained or confined, usually under harsh conditions and without regard to legal norms of arrest and imprisonment that are acceptable in a constitutional democracy. One can have the idea what the Concentration Camp was from the following piece of the Lambrick’s novel ‘The Terrorist’ and from account of those who passed long miserable years in those camps:

Saeen Rakhio, the main character of novel says: “It was a village called ‘Bhiri’, about six miles from Sanghar, and there was I born, within tall thorn hedge where policemen stood at the gate; so it is nothing strange that I should die inside a jail. You must have heard how at these places the inmates had to answer their names to the police at roll-call every morning and evening; in the daytime the men were allowed to go out on their work but at night all had to remain inside and the womenfolk might not go beyond the hedge even by day except at harvest time. Then indeed most of them and the children could go with the men for reaping the autumn crops round about Sanghar and along Dim canal, and in the spring season into Makhi, where many of us Hurs had ancient rights to cultivate, though the majority depended on grazing cattle there.”

Saeen Rakhio mentions the deputy (Sardar Yaqoob) of Lucas (Commissioner of Sindh) during whose period the hedged villages were established on his recommendations.

Sindhi book ‘Azadi Ja Aseer’, published by Roza Dhani Chair of Shah Abdul Latif University Khairpur, which is in fact a list of 5525 Hur community people, male and female, lodged in two hedged villages in Nawabshah and Khipro, describes the concentration camps as ‘a jail spread over 16 acres of land with eight feet high hedge around it and 50ft high watch towers at the four corners where the policemen were deployed round the clock to keep check on movement of confined people. Each camp had a big wooden gate with iron bars and it was guarded by armed policemen. The office and the residential quarters for the officials were built outside the camp. All the inmates had to gather at the ground near the gate inside the camp at the dawn and dusk for roll call. Each of the inmate had to tie a badge on his/her arm inscribed with his/her and father’s/husband’s name. The gate would open in the morning only after the roll-call. Initially, the womenfolk were also to appear for the roll-call but later as a result of protest they were exempted of appearance. The male inmates were allowed to go outside the camp for earning livelihood within five-mile periphery and fines and other punishments were imposed on them in case of violation. The camp administration, consisting of a Head Munishi of Revenue Department and police personnel, was not responsible for provision of food and medical facility to the inmates and often they had to starve. Several inmates including men, women and children died due to spread of diseases and starvation. The camp in-charge and policemen always forced the inmates to pay certain amount out of their daily earnings. No inmate was allowed to keep camel or horse and only donkeys were allowed for transportation.

It was a normal day when less than ten villagers expired in the camp. We used to spend whole day digging the graves and burying the dead. One day we counted 32 deaths and it was difficult for us to dig such a large number of graves for burial. Not a single day ever dawned with wailing of women and children on death of their dear ones. We felt tired of burials but the Dogra Sepoys would abuse and hit us with kicks and clubs to dig the graves and bury the dead.

Fakir Muhammad Suleman Wasan, who spent several years of his life in concentration camps of Wango and Gihlpur (Where the police-line exists now in Sanghar Town), told in an interview that a large number of men, women and children were lodged in the camp along with livestock. The ration, they provided, was substandard or poisonous, which caused outbreak of stomach diseases resulting in death of many villagers in a single day. “It was a normal day when less than ten villagers expired in the camp. We used to spend whole day digging the graves and burying the dead. One day we counted 32 deaths and it was difficult for us to dig such a large number of graves for burial. Not a single day ever dawned with wailing of women and children on death of their dear ones. We felt tired of burials but the Dogra Sepoys would abuse and hit us with kicks and clubs to dig the graves and bury the dead.”

Sardar Yaqoob suggested the British authorities of deporting the Hur families, men, women and children, on massive scale to Punjab, NWFP (Khyber Pakhtoonkhaw) and remote Indian territories. “They should be kept in concentration camps there besides establishing such camps in Sindh. Rest of the people of Hur community should be ordered to live near the police stations and appear daily at the police stations.”

In his report mentioned above, justifying the establishment of concentration camps, Sardar Yaqoob writes: “Colonization of retired army personnel and other outsiders will not deliver anything. The only solution to the problem could be compelling the Pir Pagara to order his disciples stop the activities. Moreover, since the Hur community is not in possession of agriculture land and their only source of livelihood is livestock, they should be crushed economically.”

He suggested the British authorities of deporting the Hur families, men, women and children, on massive scale to Punjab, NWFP (Khyber Pakhtoonkhaw) and remote Indian territories. “They should be kept in concentration camps there besides establishing such camps in Sindh. Rest of the people of Hur community should be ordered to live near the police stations and appear daily at the police stations,” he had suggested.

According to him the Pir Pagaro had two hundred thousand disciples in six districts of Sindh that included 70, 000 in Tharparkar, 2000 in Jacobabad, 1,000 in Karachi, 17000 in Khairpur state, 75000 in Hyderabad and 25000 in Shikarpur. He thought that 5453 disciples were actively engaged in insurgency and were a big threat to British authority. As per his proposal, the Hur community people including men and women were to be put into concentration camps. Their numbers were as follows:

A total of 3513 men and women hailing from Taluka Sanghar, Khipro, Shahdadpur and Makhi area; 1366 men and women of Taluka Hala, Tando Allahyar, Sakrand, Mirpur Khas, Umarkot, Moro, Naushehro Feroze and Kandiari; 40 men and women from Tharparkar; 75 men and women from Shikarpur; 20 from Jacobabad and 400 men and women from Khairpur state. No disciple from Karachi was put in concentration camps.

Sardar Yaqoob recommended enforcement of Article 2 of Criminal Tribes Act xxvii of 1871 with addition of certain clauses from Punjab Murderous Outrages Act xxiii 1867.

In his letter, Sardar Yaqoob suggested the British to promulgate Criminal Tribes Act for action against Hurs settled in eleven Talukas of Tharparkar and Hyderabad districts. According to the data provided by him, the total number of male adults of Hur community in the two districts was 4879.

Sardar Yaqoob proposed three concentration camps to be established in Sanghar Taluka – one each at Sanghar, Jhol and Bhiri; two concentration camps at Khipro and one in the limits of Khhaan police station for the Hur community of Mirpur Khas. He identified these locations for concentration camps in view of police stations as well as check posts already existing there with availability of sufficient police force. According to him 1060 male and 883 female members of Hur community belonging to Keerio, Bihan, Wasan, Rajar, Hingoro, Mochi, Junejo, Kori, Khaskheli, Chaang, Sanjrani, Gaho, Nizamani, Jokhia and Saand castes would be lodged at three concentration camps of Sanghar Taluka. For two concentration camps of Khipro Taluka, he proposed 369 male and 307 female members of Mangrio, Hingorjo, Bihan, Rajar, Hingora, Gujo, Kori, Sameja, Pahorr, Junejo, Keerio and some other castes. Since there were a few Hur families (13 adults and 9 children) in Umarkot Taluka, all peasants, belonging to Mangrio, Bhanbhro, Rajar and Syed communities, he suggested to keep them at nearest concentration camp in Khipro Taluka. He identified 15 families of Mahar, Bihan and Junejo consisting of 28 male and 22 female members, of them 12 landholders, who were to be lodged at concentration camp to be established in the limits of Khhaan police station.

Four concentration camps were suggested for Hyderabad district, one at Shahdadpur, four in Sakrand Taluka, where Jalalani or Sakrand camp was the biggest one. Seven villages of Hur community people were identified in Hala Taluka, which were considered as dangerous, as a Hur warrior Wasand Kazak hailed from one of these villages, and thus a concentration camp and a police station was suggested for them at Chharao. The Hurs residing in Chharao were found involved in derailing Lahore Express in 1942 during last phase of Hur guerrilla war.

For the Hur community people of Naushehro Feroze, mainly of Dahri caste, totaling 181 male and 135 female members, a concentration camp was proposed at Misir Ji Warri. Another camp for 220 male and 188 female members of Dahri, Khaskheli, Lohar (blacksmith), Hajam (Barbars), Keerio and Parhyar castes, was to be setup at Saawrri village in riverine area of Moro town. The 15 male and 12 female members of Hur community people of Rajpar and Lohar castes from Kandiaro were to be shifted to           ‘Misir Ji Waarri’ camp of Naushehro Feroze. The reason for establishing concentration camps in Moro and Naushehro Feroze was the desert area of 30 mile distance between Sakrand and Moro, which according to Sardar Yaqoob, could be used by the Hurs as hiding place after committing ‘crimes’ in Sanghar and Sakrand areas.

The Newzealand-based Sindhi researcher Prof. Umar Chand in his book mentions setting up of first ever hedged village or concentration camp at ‘Janib Dhoro’ in 1895. The other concentration camps were established later, as according to correspondence between the officials of Sindh and the Bombay Government, Sardar Yaqoob submitted his detailed report to the Commissioner of Sindh on September 30, 1898 and after two months on November 23, 1898, the same report was forwarded to the Governor and President in Council, Bombay (Some researchers mention Lord Willingdon’s name as Governor of Bombay, which is incorrect, as Lord Sandhurst William Mansfield held this office from 1895 to 1900), by Robert Giles, the acting Commissioner of Sindh in place of Sir H. M. James who earlier on June 07, 1896 in a letter to the Bombay government had opposed imposing the Criminal Tribes Act on Hurs. “The Criminal Tribes Act contained no section under which, it could be extended to Sindh nor would it suit the case for the Hurs as they are not the ordinary criminals. They differ from ordinary classes of criminals of India,” he stated describing the Hurs as having a strong religious fanatic element in their character, and recalling their history compared them with rebellious Irish peasants who were protected by whole community in case of assassination of an unpopular landlord. However Robert Giles’ in his memorandum number 2834 recommended imposition of Criminal Tribes Act 1871 but explained the reasons why it was not appropriate to deport Hurs outside Sindh. As per order number 2536 and 2537, dated May 25, 1899, issued by Governor from Bombay, the Criminal Tribes Act was enforced in Sindh to punish the Hurs for rebellion. The inhuman law was executed in eleven Talukas of Sindh, where according to Sardar Yaqoob’s report there were 151 villages of Hurs, not very distant from vast jungles. He did not include certain areas of Shikarpur, Hyderabad and Tharparkar for enforcement of Criminal Tribes Act, as according to him there were hardly 36 male and 38 female adult Hurs in Rohri and Larkana while 40 adult Hurs were surveyed in Tando Bago Taluka of Hyderabad. A small village named ‘Bhagi Sar’ existed in Chhachhro Taluka where the Hurs of Halepota clan used to live. Being in small numbers and peasants by profession, they were easy to be controlled by police.

The British administration took measures to deport Hurs to Punjab, North West Frontier Province and United Provinces of India, but failed as Punjab and then NWFP refused to accept ‘dangerous criminals’

By the April 1900, the law was enacted to setup concentration camps to lodge entire Hur community in 15 such camps of which six were in Tharparkar district including Mirpur Khas, Sanghar, Jhol, Khipro, Shahdadpur and nine in Hyderabad district including Nawabshah, Sakrand, Hala, Moro and Naushehro Feroze. The total number of adult inmates including male and female of six hedged villages of tharparkar was 2870 while 2804 was that of nine hedged villages of Hyderabad. The number of children lodged in all the camps was equal to number of adult inmates.

The British administration took measures to deport Hurs to Punjab, North West Frontier Province (Present day Khyber Pakhtoonkhaw) and United Provinces of India, but failed as Punjab and then NWFP refused to accept ‘dangerous criminals’. Lucas, in a letter to Bombay Governor Lord Willingdon Freeman Thomas (1913-18) on June 1914, had questioned ‘why the government didn’t consider deporting the Hurs to Bombay Presidency when the Punjab and NWFP refused to accept them?’ Elaborating the idea of deporting the Hurs outside Sindh, Lucas quoted Robert Giles’ memorandum, he stated that ‘in submitting the proposal, Mr. Giles had explained that one of the principal objects of declaring the Hurs as criminal tribe was to enable the authorities to deport some of the worst members of this fanatical sect, and had expressed the opinion that no measure short of removal from Sindh would be really effective.’

Dr. Nabi Bux Baloch writes in his paper that the British government had abolished the concentration camps when Pir Pagaro Shah Mardan Shah (Father of Pir Sibghatullah Shah-II) promised to arrange 500 militants and financial help during the First World War in 1914. Baloch Sahib’s contention must be based on his own research, but the official correspondence available at Sindh Archives is a big proof that the concentration camps were never abolished. This chapter contains details of official correspondence.

The British authorities’ record includes a list of inmates of concentration camps of Nawabshah and Khipro prepared in 1944-45. Each page of this file bears ‘List of Registration Hur Criminal Tribe Members in Sindh Province’. The list contains the names of 5525 male and female Hurs lodged in camps from 1928 to 1944.

The total number of Hurs lodged in concentration camps exceeds the number mentioned in this list of 1944-45 or earlier in Sardar Yaqoob’s report of 1896, as the record pertaining to this subject seems incomplete. The number of concentration camps, which is said to be 15, also looks doubtful, as at some places 21 such camps were reported in Sindh alone. Moreover, several concentration camps were setup in Indian states where deported Hurs were lodged.

According to some Hurs – Fakir Haji Nangar Hingorjo, Haji Fakir Abdullah Hingoro and several others, interviewed in 1980s, the number of Hurs and their families exceeded two hundred thousands, as five to ten thousand people were lodged in each concentration camp. Abdullah Hingoro told that ten thousand people were confined in each of the camp at Jhol, Sinjhoro, Jarwar near Mirpur Mathelo, Shahdadpur, Mirpur Khas, Warah, Akri, Pithoro, Shadi Pali, Nawabshah, Johi, Khipro etc. One Sanwal Fkir Rajar told that he spent certain period at Shadi Pali and Johi concentration camp where 4500 and 5000 men, women and children were lodged respectively.

(Continues)   

Click here for reading Part -I 

____________________

Excerpts from the prize-winning research-based book ‘Hur – The Freedom Fighter’, authored by Nasir Aijaz, published by Sindh Culture Department in August 2015. 

The post The British savagery against Hur Community in Sindh – Part II first appeared on Sindh Courier.

By Kriti M. Shah

Baloch tribes developed a sardar system in the early 15th century. The sardar would pledge loyalty to the Baloch Khan of Kalat and promise to defend the Khan’s kingdom against any outside attack. The position of the sardar was a crucial feature of membership in a Baloch tribe, and the ordinary Baloch were resigned to the leadership of the sardar. He was seen as a central and unifying presence, with the power to settle disputes between tribe members. The British would use this system to their advantage and force the Khannate to become a loose federation; over time, it became a ghost of its former self.

The British appointed and bribed leaders amongst the Pashtuns as well. However, the concept of a sardar is absent from Pashtun society, where the main decision-making body is the institution of the jirga. The jirga allows all adult male members of the tribe to collectively make decisions and prevents the concentration of power in a single individual. In such a system, the tribal leaders are accorded their power from within the tribe and not from their relation to the British. It was the opposite case in Balochistan, where support from the British allowed sardars to develop authority within their tribe. This helps to understand how the western frontier would evolve with its integration into Pakistan, and how the Pakistani state would dictate the frontier’s future.

The Khan of Kalat entered into an agreement with the British in 1839 which allowed them to trade and have military movements through Quetta, Bolan and Khojak passes, in return for a INR 50,000 subsidy. Over time, British involvement increased through further treaties, alliances with influential sardars, and military incursions. Within the next few years, the British annexed Sindh (1843) and Punjab (1849), extending their political footprint. The Khan of Kalat was left with no allies.

In 1877, Robert Sandeman was appointed as chief commissioner for the agency of Balochistan. He negotiated a treaty between the colonial government and the Khan of Kalat and his sardars, which allowed the British to consult and construct in the region as well as appoint a British agent to reside in the court of Kalat and settle disputes between the Khan and his sardars. The agreement reaffirmed the status of the Khan as a leader of an independent, albeit subordinate allied state. This helped the British thwart any resistance that grew amongst the local population against the Khan, who was now essentially an ‘agent’ or had at least accepted the growing clout of the British in their homeland. It was under this system that the role of sardars became part of a hierarchical British institution in the state. As the British gave sardars salaries, the fear of being denied money (which they knew would increase their influence within the tribe) forced sardars to follow British orders. In 1883, the British leased Quetta, Marri-Bugti, the Bolan Pass under the name of “British Balochistan”. Except for the Marri-Bugti area, the rest of the British Balochistan region was Pashtun-dominated.

The colonial administration faced a number of social and administrative challenges as a result of their intrusion, despite treaties designed to “keep peace” with the Khan. While they continued to expand with the building of military cantonments, post offices and setting up telegraph and railway lines, the Baloch tribes put up resistance. In the years leading up to the departure of the British and the partition of India, small-scale attacks were conducted by the Baloch tribes, punctuated by a series of uprisings. In 1897, Pashtun warriors attacked British forces across the frontier. Nonetheless, the British laid the foundation for the Balochistan agency, leaving Kalat (which was predominantly Baloch) free of colonial pressure.

On 12 August 1947, two days before the creation of Pakistan, Kalat declared its independence. After the creation of Pakistan, Kalat offered special relations in areas of defence and foreign affairs. Pakistan refused and demanded its integration into the new state. In March 1948, Pakistan annexed the entire region. A speech by Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, a Baloch nationalist in 1947, summed up how the Baloch felt about joining Pakistan: “Pakistani officials are pressuring to join Pakistan, because Balochistan would not be able to sustain itself economically… we have minerals, we have petroleum and ports. The question is where would Pakistan be without us?”

The British policy towards the Pashtun and the Baloch set the foundation for Pakistan’s state policy towards the two ethnic groups. While the Pashtuns were stereotyped as warriors and fighters, they were integrated into the army and allowed to govern themselves under FCR and certain aspects of the Pashtun tribal code. The Baloch were manipulated by coopting their leaders to support the British. Such a policy would continue as the state of Pakistan came into being.

The Role of State Policy

The partition of India in 1947 led to the creation of an ethnically and linguistically diverse Pakistan. While East Pakistan was more culturally and linguistically homogenous, West Pakistan was less so, with five major languages, various dialects, religions, castes and tribal identities. Many groups in Pakistan have similar cultural affiliations with groups outside the borders. The Pashtuns, for example, are also found in eastern Afghanistan, while the Baloch, in southern Afghanistan and Iran.

The state ideology was based on three founding principles: Islam would be the unifying force; Urdu would be the language of the people; and the military would be strengthened to counter “Hindu India”. Instead of establishing institutions that would accord equal rights to the various ethno-linguistic groups, the state projected Islam as their common denominator. The policy exacerbated ethnic divisions in the innately diverse nation; the assertion of any ethno-linguistic identity in the context of seeking political rights was seen as divisive.

Each of these ethnic groups has had a unique path to mobilization. Yet, across all of them, the drivers of ethnic conflict are largely the same: the lack of provincial autonomy; economic exploitation; and political and military oppression.

Lack of Provincial Autonomy

In the first few decades of Pakistan’s existence as a sovereign territory, the politics of the nation was defined by the government’s ‘One Unit’ plan. The scheme involved the integration of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan into a single province of West Pakistan. The aim was to neutralise the Bengali majority in East Pakistan. It was strongly opposed by the people of NWFP, Balochistan and Sindh. By then, the Pashtuns had been coopted by the Pakistani leadership and were either part of mainstream politics or serving in the military and becoming the second largest ethnic group within the army. The One Unit plan thwarted any sort of autonomy for the different ethnic groups. In NWFP, Gaffar Khan led the movement against One Unit, undertaking tours across the tribal region to address rallies and raise ethno-nationalist consciousness against the plan. The Pakistani state naturally saw the Pashtun nationalist leaders as projecting their Pashtun identity above their Islamic identity.

Following Kalat’s annexation in 1948, the Pakistani government announced that it would be treated in the same manner as it was during the British era. This meant the appointment of a political agent, entrusted with the powers to look after the state administration and guide the government on the internal matters of the state. The Baloch strongly resisted Pakistan assertion, seeing them as no different from the British. The government responded by banning political parties in Kalat and arresting the Baloch leadership. Over the years, the government in Islamabad has repeatedly tried to assimilate Baloch identity into the larger Pakistan identity. Since 1947, the state has engaged the Baloch in violent confrontations on five occasions (1948, 1958, 1962, 1973-77 and 2001 onwards).

The One Unit scheme sparked a violent uprising in Balochistan as the policy decreased Baloch representation at the federal level and forestalled the establishment of a provincial assembly, which had yet to be approved by the central government nearly a decade after Partition. The Khan of Kalat mobilized tribal leaders against the scheme which they saw as the federal government’s way of centralizing power and limiting provincial autonomy. The government arrested the Baloch leaders and crushed the revolt. The province continued to be treated like a colony and the central government exploited the resources.

(Continues)

_____________________

About the Author

Kriti M. Shah is an Associate Fellow in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Observer Research Foundation. Her research primarily focusses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where she studies their domestic politics as well as their relationship with each other, the Taliban, the United States and the larger South Asian neighborhood. Her other areas of interest include the role of technology in fighting terrorism in Kashmir and the ongoing Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and its dynamic and tumultuous relationship with the Pakistani state. Prior to joining ORF, she worked as reporter for NDTV. She is a graduate of McGill University in Montreal, Canada.

Courtesy: Observer Research Foundation

The post The Baloch and Pashtun nationalist movements in Pakistan – II first appeared on Sindh Courier.

By Dr. Crispin Bates

Reasons for partition

India and Pakistan won independence in August 1947, following a nationalist struggle lasting nearly three decades. It set a vital precedent for the negotiated winding up of European empires elsewhere. Unfortunately, it was accompanied by the largest mass migration in human history of some 10 million. As many as one million civilians died in the accompanying riots and local-level fighting, particularly in the western region of Punjab which was cut in two by the border.

The agreement to divide colonial India into two separate states – one with a Muslim majority (Pakistan) and the other with a Hindu majority (India) is commonly seen as the outcome of conflict between the nations’ elites. This explanation, however, renders the mass violence that accompanied partition difficult to explain.

If Pakistan were indeed created as a homeland for Muslims, it is hard to understand why far more were left behind in India than were incorporated into the new state of Pakistan – a state created in two halves, one in the east (formerly East Bengal, now Bangladesh) and the other 1,700 kilometers away on the western side of the subcontinent.

It is possible that Mohammed Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, simply wished to use the demand for a separate state as a bargaining chip to win greater power for Muslims within a loosely federated India. Certainly, the idea of ‘Pakistan’ was not thought of until the late 1930s.

One explanation for the chaotic manner in which the two independent nations came into being is the hurried nature of the British withdrawal. This was announced soon after the victory of the Labor Party in the British general election of July 1945, amid the realization that the British state, devastated by war, could not afford to hold on to its over-extended empire.

Transfer of power

An act of parliament proposed a date for the transfer of power into Indian hands in June 1948, summarily advanced to August 1947 at the whim of the last viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. This left a great many issues and interests unresolved at the end of colonial rule.

In charge of negotiations, the viceroy exacerbated difficulties by focusing largely on Jinnah’s Muslim League and the Indian National Congress (led by Jawaharlal Nehru).

The two parties’ representative status was established by Constituent Assembly elections in July 1946, but fell well short of a universal franchise.

Tellingly, although Pakistan celebrated its independence on 14 August and India on 15 August 1947, the border between the two new states was not announced until 17 August.

It was hurriedly drawn up by a British lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe, who had little knowledge of Indian conditions and with the use of out-of-date maps and census materials.

Communities, families and farms were cut in two, but by delaying the announcement the British managed to avoid responsibility for the worst fighting and the mass migration that had followed.

Tensions in India

Many have wondered why the British and Indian leaders did not delay until a better deal over borders could have been agreed. One explanation is that in the months and years immediately following World War Two, leaders on all sides were losing control and were keen to strike a deal before the country descended into chaos.

Immediately before World War Two, India was ravaged by the impact of the Great Depression, bringing mass unemployment. This created tremendous tensions exacerbated during the war by inflation and food grain shortages. Rationing was introduced in Indian cities and in Bengal a major famine developed in 1942.

The resulting discontent was expressed in widespread violence accompanying the Congress party’s ‘Quit India’ campaign of 1942 – a violence only contained by the deployment of 55 army battalions.

With the cessation of hostilities, the battalions at the disposal of the government in India were rapidly diminished. At the same time, the infrastructure of the Congress Party, whose entire leadership was imprisoned due to their opposition to the war, had been dismantled.

The Muslim League, which co-operated with the British, had rapidly increased its membership, yet still had very limited grassroots level organization.

This was dramatically revealed on the 16 August 1946, when Jinnah called for a ‘Direct Action Day’ by followers of the League in support of the demand for Pakistan. The day had dissolved into random violence and civil disruption across north India, with thousands of lives lost.

This was interpreted by the British as evidence of the irreconcilable differences between Hindus and Muslims. In reality, the riots were evidence as much of a simple lack of military and political control as they were of social discord.

Further evidence of the collapse of government authority was to be seen in the Princely State of Hyderabad, where a major uprising occurred in the Telengana region, and with the Tebhaga (‘two-thirds’) agitation among share-cropping cultivators in north Bengal. A leading role was played in both by the Communist Party of India.

Elsewhere, the last months of British rule were marked by a naval mutiny, wage strikes and successful demonstrations in every major city. In all of these conflicts the British colonial government remained aloof, as it concentrated on the business of negotiating a speedy transfer of power.

Hopes for Pakistan

Strong support for the idea of an independent Pakistan came from large Muslim landowning families in the Punjab and Sindh, who saw it as an opportunity to prosper within a captive market free from competition.

Support also came from the poor peasantry of East Bengal, who saw it as an opportunity to escape from the clutches of moneylenders – often Hindu. Both were to be disappointed. Independent Pakistan inherited India’s longest and strategically most problematic borders.

At the same time, 90% of the subcontinent’s industry, and taxable income base remained in India, including the largest cities of Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta. The economy of Pakistan was chiefly agricultural, and controlled by feudal elites.

Furthermore, at the division of India, Pakistan won a poor share of the colonial government’s financial reserves – with 23% of the undivided land mass, it inherited only 17.5% of the former government’s financial assets. Once the army had been paid, nothing was left over for the purposes of economic development.

The great advantage enjoyed by the Indian National Congress was that it had worked hard for 40 years to reconcile differences and achieve some cohesion among its leaders. The heartland of support for the Muslim League, however, lay in central north India (Uttar Pradesh) which was not included within Pakistan.

Muslims from this region had to flee westwards and compete with resident populations for access to land and employment, leading to ethnic conflict, especially in Sindh.

Post-partition and conflict over Kashmir

The death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, the conflict with India over the Princely State of Kashmir (which both countries claimed at independence), as well as ethnic and religious differences within Pakistan itself, all combined to stymie early attempts to agree on a constitution and an effectively functioning civil administration.

This failure paved the way for a military takeover of the government in 1958 and later on, a civil war in 1971. This saw the division of the country and the creation of the separate state of Bangladesh. Ever since then, military rule has been more often than not the order of the day in both countries.

At independence, in India and in Pakistan, civil unrest as well as ethnic and religious discord threatened the stability of the new country. However, the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi on 30 January 1948 by a Hindu fanatic strengthened the hand of secularists within the government.

Indian politicians ratified a constitution, which led to the first democratic elections in 1951. This made India the world’s largest democracy and consolidated governmental authority over the entire subcontinent.

However, major tensions have persisted among both Muslim and Sikh communities, which suffered most from the violence and land loss resulting from partition. These tensions erupted most seriously in the 1980s in a violent campaign for the creation of a separate Sikh state which led ultimately to the assassination of Indira Gandhi.

Renewed victimization of Muslims has also occurred, notably with the destruction of the Muslim shrine at Ayodhya in 1992 and anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2004. With such notable exceptions, however, India has maintained a remarkable level of cohesion since independence, especially if one considers that it is a country nearly the size of Europe.

For both India and Pakistan, the most singular conflict unresolved since partition has concerned the former Princely State of Kashmir, whose fate was left undetermined at the time the British left. Lying as it did on the border, Kashmir was claimed by both countries, which have been to war over this region on numerous occasions.

The conflict has wasted thousands of lives and millions of dollars, but is closer to a solution now than at any time since independence. If achieved, it might finally bring to fruition the dreams of Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi and once more set an example for post-colonial societies elsewhere in Africa, Asia and the Middle East to imitate and follow.

_______________________

Courtesy: BBC (Article was published on BBC website on March 03, 2011)

The post The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies first appeared on Sindh Courier.