• On paper, Pakistan possesses a remarkably clear administrative history of protective employment measures. But where is the quota?
• If a 5% minority quota exists, every recruiting authority should be able to answer simple questions: How many vacancies were advertised? How many were reserved for minorities? How many minority candidates applied? How many were selected? How many reserved posts remained vacant? How many were carried forward? And how many minority employees are presently serving in each category of government employment?

By: Kalavanti Raja

Pakistan was created with the promise of a society in which citizenship, rather than religion, would determine the rights and dignity of an individual. In his historic address to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah spoke of religious freedom, protection of life and property, and a state in which citizens would be able to live according to their faith. The National Assembly itself continues to describe that address as laying the foundation for religious freedom, equality, tolerance and the rule of law.

Yet Pakistan’s subsequent history presents a complicated picture. While the principle of equal citizenship was proclaimed at the birth of the country, the State simultaneously recognized that some historically disadvantaged communities could not achieve genuine equality merely through a declaration of equal rights. This was the reasoning behind affirmative measures for Scheduled Castes and, decades later, for religious minorities.

Ignored 6% quota and Scheduled Castes

The roots of the Scheduled Castes classification go back to British India. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the colonial constitutional system formally provided for identification of communities requiring special safeguards, followed by the Government of India (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1936. The underlying purpose was to identify communities that had suffered generations of social exclusion and discrimination under the caste system.

After the creation of Pakistan, the new state did not simply discard this inherited protective principle. On 19 October 1948, the Establishment Division issued O.M. No. 56/2/48-Ests.(ME), reserving 6% of vacancies in direct recruitment to the All-Pakistan Superior Services and Central Services, Classes I, II and III, for Scheduled Castes. The policy therefore became part of Pakistan’s own post-Independence administrative framework.

The decision was not merely symbolic. By 1957, the government had recognized that the reserved vacancies were not being adequately utilized because qualified candidates were often unavailable. Instead of simply abandoning the arrangement, the Establishment Division issued further instructions on 30 October 1957 requiring greater publicity of federal vacancies in areas where Scheduled Caste communities lived. This is a revealing historical fact: the government recognized that historical deprivation itself could prevent a community from benefiting from a formal quota.

The 6% reservation therefore represented an early form of affirmative action. It acknowledged that formal equality and substantive equality are not always the same thing.

There is no reliable evidence in the surviving published order to establish that the figure of 6% was calculated precisely from the population share of Scheduled Castes. It is therefore better not to repeat that claim without documentary evidence. What is clear is that the Government deliberately selected 6% as the employment reservation for Scheduled Castes in 1948. The arrangement survived for nearly five decades. Then came a decisive change.

On 24 September 1996, the Establishment Division issued O.M. No. F.4/15/94-R.II, withdrawing with immediate effect the separate Scheduled Castes quota created through the 1948 order. The official formulation was that Scheduled Caste candidates would thereafter compete alongside other candidates of their own province.

The published withdrawal order, however, does not provide a detailed explanation of why the government decided to abolish the separate quota. That omission matters. It would be historically and legally unsafe to claim a particular reason unless the underlying government record or Cabinet decision is produced.

From Scheduled Castes to minorities

The next major development came not in 1991, as is sometimes stated, but in 2009. On 20 May 2009, the Federal Cabinet decided to introduce a 5% employment quota for minorities. This was followed by Establishment Division O.M. No. 4/15/94-R-2 dated 26 May 2009, reserving 5% of posts across the Federal Government for Minorities (Non-Muslims) in direct recruitment, including CSS, in addition to their right to compete on open merit.

The 2009 notification was broader than the old Scheduled Castes arrangement. It defined minorities through Article 260(3)(b) of the Constitution, thereby covering the non-Muslim communities specified in that constitutional provision, including Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis, Ahmadis, Bahais and Scheduled Castes.

The notification also contained an important safeguard: where qualified minority candidates were unavailable for reserved vacancies, those vacancies were to be carried forward and filled by minority candidates in future. The order was also extended to attached departments, autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, corporations, public corporations and companies administratively controlled by the Federal Government.

On paper, therefore, Pakistan possesses a remarkably clear administrative history of protective employment measures. But where is the quota? This is where the real question begins. What happened to these provisions when they left the government file and entered the workplace?

The central concern is not whether Pakistan has issued notifications. It has. The concern is whether ministries, departments, public bodies and government-controlled institutions have actually maintained transparent data showing recruitment against the reserved quota.

If a 5% minority quota exists, every recruiting authority should be able to answer simple questions: How many vacancies were advertised? How many were reserved for minorities? How many minority candidates applied? How many were selected? How many reserved posts remained vacant? How many were carried forward? And how many minority employees are presently serving in each category of government employment?

These questions should not be difficult for a modern state to answer. Yet the absence of easily accessible, consolidated and department-wise data creates a serious credibility problem. A quota without transparent monitoring risks becoming a provision that exists beautifully in official notifications but weakly in actual implementation.

This issue deserves particular attention because today’s minority population includes highly educated professionals, engineers, doctors, lawyers, academics, scientists, administrators and other qualified citizens. Their problem is not necessarily the absence of talent. The more fundamental question is whether the State is providing them the fair institutional opportunity that its own policies promise.

A call to Parliament

This is therefore an issue that should rise above political party lines. The present Parliament, including minority parliamentarians and members of the relevant standing committees, should ask every Federal Government ministry, division, attached department, autonomous body, corporation and public-sector organization to produce verifiable recruitment data relating to the minority quota from 2009 to the present.

The exercise should not be limited to asking whether the quota exists. It should establish whether it has been implemented.

Every department should disclose the number of sanctioned posts, vacancies advertised, minority quota vacancies, appointments made against those vacancies, unfilled vacancies and carried-forward positions. The same information should be placed before Parliament and made publicly accessible.

Pakistan cannot simultaneously proclaim equal citizenship, create affirmative safeguards for disadvantaged citizens and then remain silent about whether those safeguards are functioning.

The history is clear: in 1948, the State recognized the need for a 6% Scheduled Castes employment reservation; in 1996, that separate quota was withdrawn; and in 2009, a 5% quota for minorities was formally introduced across Federal Government direct recruitment.

The question before Pakistan today is therefore not whether minorities have been given promises. They have. The question is whether those promises have ever been converted into measurable representation.

Read: Deepa Mehta – Voice of Courage

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Kalavanti Raja is a social and political activist from Gambat, Khairpur Mirs, with 30 years of work on women’s rights, minorities, and social justice. She has served in Sindhiyani Tahreek and participated in national and international forums across Asia, Europe, and America.. She can be reached at kalavanti.raja@gmail.com

The post Political Silence Stalls Minority Quotas first appeared on Sindh Courier.

[The research paper was authored in 2021 but the situation in Sindh remains unchanged]  

By Zachary Skidmore

Pakistan’s southern province of Sindh is confronted by issues ranging from poor governance, lack of support to small and medium-sized farmers and a fragile regulatory framework. A study in contrasts defined by sharp urban-rural and socioeconomic divides, Sindh’s politics has ethnic and sub-nationalist elements. Despite huge productivity potential, Sindh remains largely untapped. The available data suggest that Sindh has experienced little improvements in any of the human development indicators over the past two decades. Moreover, the province is faced with a large influx of people from other parts of Pakistan who put an additional burden on its resources and infrastructure. The province’s extremes range from the wealth and density of Karachi, the mega port city that dominates the economy not only of Sindh but also of Pakistan as a whole, and the poverty in other parts like Tharparkar.

The rural districts of Sindh are home to some of the most impoverished citizens of Pakistan, many of them haris (sharecroppers) who are tied to waderos (landowners) in bonded labor arrangements. Industrial and commercial activity in Karachi has long outpaced the agricultural economy that flourishes on the banks of the Indus in Sindh, further exacerbating the province’s economic divisions.

The center regularly commits excesses with the province. Sindh’s political leadership claims that that by showing a reduced population of the province in the census figures the federal government deprives the region it of its increased share in the divisible pool in the National Finance Commission Award.

Water and Agrarian Crisis

Sindh holds a special place as far as its contribution to the overall agrarian economy of the country is concerned. However, despite having a climatic advantage, Sindh’s crop yields are decreasing. Sindh comes up with an impressive output of wheat every year despite pre- and post-harvest losses at various stages, but because the province lacks storage capacity, only a limited quantity is procured from farmers at support price and the rest is hoarded or sold in the market at lower prices. Of the four million tons of wheat produced by the province, only 1.3m tons are procured every year after hiring rented premises.

Presently at the height of summer, the Guddu Barrage in Sindh province is facing the “worst water shortage in 60 years.” Pakistan’s government has circulated an advisory to farmers not to go for paddy sowing in May and June as all three barrages in Sindh are bearing with 36.94pc water shortage. Every year wherever cotton is grown or paddy nurseries are prepared in Sindh, the crops are affected due to water shortage. On the other hand, 50,000 acres of land is irrigated in Punjab’s riverine area out of the water flows released for Sindh. The timely availability of water remains essential for achieving desired growth in the agriculture sector. However, being a lower riparian region, Sindh continues to face water shortage more often than not.

Worsening the problem is the tug of war between the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) members from Pakistan’s Sindh and Punjab over water distribution. This dispute has aggravated over the opening of TP-link canal from the Indus at a time when the low riparian federating units are craving for water even for drinking purposes. Recently the Pakistan Peoples Party’s (PPP) in Sindh chapter announced holding protests against Imran Khan’s government at the district level in the Sindh province from June 3 to June 15 against acute water shortage.

Law and order problems in Sindh have been exacerbated by systemic issues, including socioeconomic factors, an extreme urban-rural divide, poor governance, and a centuries-old feudal system

Amid the rising population and climate change, the availability of freshwater is becoming worrisome in Pakistan, which may face absolute water scarcity by 2040. In 2016 a commission appointed to probe whether people in Sindh received clean drinking water, and whether the Sindh Environmental Protection Agency (Sepa) had discharged its statutory responsibilities conclude that the “people of Sindh are not drinking clean water. The mixing of untreated sewage with freshwater bodies — rivers, canals, lakes, ponds etc. — was found to be the prime cause of contamination. It was found that water is unfit for drinking purpose in many cities.

Environmental & Health Crisis in Sindh

Even as Pakistan is listed as the 7th most affected country by climate change, within the country, Sindh is the worst affected by extreme weather events that are the classic manifestations of climate change. Erratic rain patterns have led to decline of rainfall.

A World Bank (WB) analysis ‘Sustainability and Poverty Alleviation: Confronting Environmental Threats in Sindh’ estimates that 45,000 people died prematurely in 2009 in Sindh from major environmental health hazards, and its economic impact in terms of GDP was 15 per cent of Sindh’s GDP, with an annual cost of about PKR 372 billion. The most important environmental problems are those affecting human health. The report recommended that lead exposure should also be tackled urgently, as it resulted in irreversible effects, including impaired intelligence in children, which have significant and lifelong consequences. Among the problems, inadequate water supply, sanitation, and hygiene has the highest cost; air pollution, both in urban areas and within households, is another pressing challenge. The problems associated with degradation of natural resources and losses from floods and other natural disasters have a cost equal to 5.3 per cent of the province’s GDP.

Amid challenges from several public service issues, another crisis is looming large as major hospitals across Sindh are running their operations without medicines. Citing the gravity of the situation during the COVID-19 pandemic, a senior health professional was quoted by the media, “The Sindh government hospitals across the province right now are running their operations without medicines and in some cases several health facilities have formally informed the authorities about their inability to operate even their emergency units in such a situation.”

Food Insecurity

Out of five provinces of Pakistan, the situation is worst in Sindh province where Food Insecurity ranges from 40 to 70%. Closely related to health and food scarcity is the stunting indicator of intensifying malnutrition Sindh. As many as 48 per cent children under the age of five are stunted while 35pc of them are severely stunted. Major nutritional problems in Sindh are low birth weight due to poor maternal nutrition, protein-energy malnutrition, anemia, and iodine deficiency. Malnutrition is a deep-rooted governance problem.

In 2020, the population faced multiple shocks including high food prices, locust outbreaks and heavy monsoon rains/flooding, all exacerbated by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Around 3.1 million people (26 percent of the rural population analyzed) are estimated to be facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in March to June 2021.

Security Crisis

Sindh was once known for its progressive politics, religious tolerance, pluralism and vibrant civil society, but the province has undergone a change and is no more immune to security challenges.

Organized crime, particularly kidnapping for ransom rackets, is the greatest current security challenge in rural Sindh. Criminal gangs operate unchecked with the patronage of political parties and influential landowners, and the politicized police force do little to clamp down on criminal activities. The dense riverine forests in Sindh provide excellent cover for the outlaws where they can disappear after committing their crimes, which run the gamut from murder and extortion to kidnapping for ransom. While that is true, there is also a political dimension to the perennial law-enforcement problem.

Even some extremist organizations are increasingly active in Sindh’s central and northern districts. Sectarian militant groups and the anti-state Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan are consolidating their presence in the province in rural areas.

In parts of interior Sindh, there have also been unconfirmed reports that the educated unemployed are joining the ranks of dacoits who offer them monetary compensation and protection in return for “services” rendered. The result is that today a thin line divides crime from politics, a gap that is likely to be bridged further by the gradual collapse of the state machinery in the interior of Sindh. Ensuring stability in Sindh is key to tackling the security situation in Karachi and in preventing the spread into the province of violent extremist and sectarian groups based in southern Punjab.

Human Rights problems

Human rights cases in Sindh, Pakistan, range from arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances to torture, extrajudicial killings, and political repression. In October 2011, Asian Human Rights Commission issued an appeal on information it had received that the Sindh University authorities allegedly used law enforcement agencies for disappearances of students in Sindh province. In a 2012 statement issued by Asian Human Rights Commission, it said that: “In Sindh province more than 100 nationalists were abducted and disappeared after 9/11, many were extra judicially killed and their tortured and bullet riddled bodies were dumped on the streets.”

According to the Chairperson of the World Sindhi Congress Rubina Greenwood, “Since February 2017, more than 300 disappearances have occurred, including young activists such as Aaqib Chandio, Shabir Kalhoro, Basit Kalhoro, Ayoob Kandhro, Kashif Tagar, Shahid Junejo, Insaf Dayo and others. The families of the missing continue to suffer.”

Hindu Bonded Labor, Forced Marriages and Conversions

The position of religious minorities in Pakistan is overwhelmingly at the bottom of the socio-economic structure. This places them in a powerless position and leaves them vulnerable to predation and forced conversions. This is often compounded by the Untouchable (Dalit) caste status of many Hindus in Sindh. According to the International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) the majority of the so-called Untouchable, or Scheduled Castes (Dalits) in Pakistan are Hindus in the Sindh region. Dalits and Hindus also make up a large part of Sindh’s landless bonded labor that forms the backbone of the economy in both agriculture and brick kilns. The situation of bonded labor places people in a virtually powerless position vis-à-vis those who own their labor. For example, 14-year-old Jeevti from Sindh, the daughter of Hindu bonded laborers, was abducted in the middle of the night from the family’s home by the landlord. She was converted to Islam and forcibly married to the landlord as his second wife because he claimed that the family owed him $1000. Jai Prakash Moorani, editor of the Sindhi daily stated, “When Hindu girls are kidnapped, forcibly converted and married to Muslims, the police, government and courts all turn a blind eye.”

It is a matter of great concern that successive federal and provincial governments had completely ignored various issues in Sindh, especially the water shortage, unemployment, steep prices of essential commodities and law and order situation

Evidence provided by numerous NGOs, journalists and academics have shown that abductions and forced conversions are one of the most serious problems facing Hindu and Christian women and girls. Former vice-chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Amarnath Motual, notes that 20 or more Hindu girls are abducted every month in Pakistan. The volunteer group, Responsible for Equality and Liberty estimates that between 20 to 25 Hindu girls are forcibly converted every month.

Conclusion

It is a matter of great concern that successive federal and provincial governments had completely ignored various issues in Sindh, especially the water shortage, unemployment, steep prices of essential commodities and law and order situation.

Law and order problems in Sindh have been exacerbated by systemic issues, including socioeconomic factors, an extreme urban-rural divide, poor governance, and a centuries-old feudal system. The authorities are yet to fulfil their obligations under these international treaties to protect the rights of vulnerable minorities from forced conversions and forced marriages. Political representation for religious minorities, law enforcement, legal system capacity, education policies, government accountability and transparency, and job creation are key to enhancing stability, both within the province and across the country.

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Zachary Skidmore is London based researcher who serves as a research assistant for Peace for Asia. A recent Masters graduate in International Studies and Diplomacy from SOAS, University of London, his main areas of interest lie in human rights abuses in Asia and the impact of the growth of regional super powers on marginalized communities throughout the continent.

Courtesy: Peace for Asia (Published on JUL 1, 2021)

The post Sindh –A Province in Turmoil first appeared on Sindh Courier.

By Zaffar Junejo

‘Our work has broken some myths,’ it was opening sentence of Maria Partab, a young woman belonging to Hindu Minority of village Muhammd Shafi Nazamani, District Tando Muhammad Khan. The opening words during a meeting at an event unleashed energy, and invited me to have more questions for understanding the ‘story of broken myths.’ Therefore, I asked: ‘how work has broken myths?’

She repeated my question into in Sindhi language, perhaps for more clarity. She smiled and confidently responded, but for it she set the context that it was not instant phenomena. There was role of institutions like National Rural Support Program (NRSP). She added that with the guidance and support of NRSP, on 6th May 2016 in her village, the Community Organization (CO) was formed. Its membership belongs to Hindu and Muslim community without any prejudice.

She giggled, and said that their village has a mixed membership, and that reality has broken a myth that Hindu and Muslim couldn’t work jointly. Perhaps, it was presumed that religion divides, but there are lots of knots that keep us connected and dependent on each other. My silence reminded her question. She went on to narrate, but again with a context that before NRSP’s interventions (village leaders’ training, linkage with the government departments, planning at village level, and management of finances) it thought that village development was the responsibility of the government and its department.

But over the period, while working with NRSP and other government departments we learned that community could be lead partner in the local development. She sought my permission to revert to my question. I agreed and she told that like other minority girls, she was of the view that development work needs huge money and lot of technical expertise. But, while working along with other villages, it became vividly clear before her that there are lots of village problems which could be solved at village level, with organized and cooperative initiatives. She quoted ‘tree plantation’, ‘culture of sanitation’ and ‘owning of primary schools’ as a few examples. She told that it was also deeply rooted myth which was unpacked that trained human intervention is equally important for the development.

I saw unleashed energy from her response. Therefore, I asked about more experiences. She responded, but again with a perspective that in her village Muslims and Hindus strongly believed that women couldn’t be leaders. Interestingly, we women also believed that it a prohibited road for us. Therefore, in a way, we were agreed that women couldn’t be leaders. But, exposure, working together and having some successful initiatives played an instrumental role that women could also lead and direct. She excitedly quoted one of their collective successes that last year 122 children attended school and majority was of girls. She emphatically told that number includes 12 girls and 3 boys from village.

‘Another myth was the collective leadership, an idea that only exists in books or minds’, she added. Long ago, she also believed that how people from different villages, having different castes and religions work together at the union council level. But continuous engagement with the community, and building their capacities proved that people having diversified interests and identities could also work collectively.

She responded another question which roamed around – ‘how the LSOs (Local Support Organizers) would carry out their activities, when the NRSP would withdraw their support?’ She responded her own assumed question, and added: ‘it is true that there may be some challenges, and their nature would be of transitions. On the other hand, considerable number of LSOs has become an institution, they have gradually transformed themselves, and most of them are capable to manage their affairs. However, their new position would need the NRSP support, but it would be around technical issues, linkages with the international donors, NGOs and providing guarantees or helping in negotiating the provincial or the federal projects. She added: ‘There would role of the NRSP, but its nature and type would be different from the present times’.

Zafar Junejo

Dr. Zaffar Junejo has a Ph.D. in History from the University of Malaya. His areas of interest are post-colonial history, social history and peasants’ history. Presently, he is associated with Sohail University and Institute of Historical and Social Research, Karachi.

The post Story of Broken Myths first appeared on Sindh Courier.