Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi

School of History & Classics, University of Edinburgh

A colonial army had to serve colonial masters

Up to and including the first half of 1928, vacancies were filled by nomination, after that date by examination. It was first decided to admit Indians and Anglo-Indians to Woolwich in 1928, and, by 1929, nine vacancies were offered. But there were only two successful candidates. Similarly, the first examination for Cranwell was held in November 1928 and, by the end of 1929, twelve vacancies had been offered but only six filled. Ayub Khan was also chosen for training as a commissioned officer at Sandhurst. He did remarkably well, securing the top position among the Indian cadets. Among his colleagues was General J. N. Choudhry who later became C-in-C of the Indian Army. The demand for the Indianisation of the forces did not end with the submission of the Skeen report. The issue was taken up once again during the Round Table conference when its sub-committee on military affairs made a demand on similar lines, including setting up a military college in India on the Sandhurst model.

Finally, the struggle was accomplished in the shape of the establishment of an Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun in October 1932. Its first batch, commissioned in 1935, were called Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs). After the Second World War, the Eight Unit Scheme was brought to an end, and all the branches of the army were opened to Indian officers. Training facilities at Dehra Dun were expanded. A large number of officers were recruited on short and long courses (short and emergency commissions). By early 1947, out of 9500 Commissioned Officers, about 500 were pre-war KCOs and ICOs. Only nine Indians (five non-Muslims, four Muslims) reached the senior rank of Lt. Colonel during World War II. Out of four Muslim Lt. Colonels, one was appointed temporary Colonel and one acting Brigadier. A few days before independence, the acting Brigadier Muhammad Akbar Khan was promoted to the rank of Major General. Promotions were given on similar lines to others in the substantive ranks below that of Lt. Colonel. The officers recruited during the war period were in junior positions. Ayub Khan was then a Brigadier in the Indian Army and was attached to the Boundary Force, under Major General Rees. In January 1948, five months after Independence, he was posted as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 14 Division in East Bengal. The army was always a very special and private concern of the British in India. They kept it away from any kind of politics. Rather, in case of any clash between the country’s politics and security, they favored the latter. Even as late as 1946, the Viceroy’s civilian Executive council had no powers over defence and the defence budget. The British Indian Army was kept free from a strong influence on Indian politics as there was no synthesis between the two. Defence had nothing to do with the politics of the country. Thus the British-Indian Army proved an autonomous entity. Their training (discipline and professionalism) and separation from the society strengthened their organizational ties and loyalty to the British authority. The army’s administrative and professional powers were concentrated in the hands of the Army chief, who after the Curzon-Kitchener dispute emerged autonomous in military affairs. This was the beginning of the exclusion of army matters from civilian control.

Ayub Khan was Brigadier in the Indian Army and was attached to the Boundary Force, under Major General Rees. In January 1948, five months after Independence, he was posted as General Officer Commanding of 14 Division in East Bengal.

The contest between the Mulki Lat Sahib [Curzon] and the Jungi Lat Sahib [Kitchener] weakened forever the once great influence of the Viceroy of India. It is interesting to note here that most of the Governor Generals and Viceroys of India were formerly military officers. One Governor – Robert Clive (Dec. 1756- Feb. 1760, April 1765-Jan. 1767) – and three Governor Generals – Lord Cornwallis (Sept. 1786-Oct. 1793 and July 1805-Oct. 1805), the Marquis of Hastings, Lord Francis Moria (Oct.1813- Jan. 1823), and Lord William Bentinck (1828-35) – functioned as C-in-Cs. Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, C-in-C, 1941-42, 1942-43 was promoted to the post of Viceroy in 1943, a position he held until March 1947. At this time, few could have imagined that this trajectory would later be used by junior officers as a short path to become military rulers of the future state in the Indian politicians made several demands for legislative control over defence forces, the defence budget and foreign policy during the 1920s and 30s. Any such control by the politicians would have been a British nightmare. Politicizing the British Indian Army was the last thing the British could ever imagine. The Esher Committee (1919-20) maintained that the Indian Army was a unit in the security system of the British Empire and that its administration could not be dissociated from the total armed forces of the empire. There were many political activities that provided acid tests for the army, but the Army personnel held on to their professional ethos and stood by the British administration. The Punjab, with its hardy and martial rural population of peasant proprietors, had, since its inclusion in the Empire, been rightly regarded as the “Shield”, the “Spearhead” and the “Sword-hand” of India. ‘It earned such proud titles due to its association with the British Army and help in every Eastern campaign from the Mutiny down to the present day’. A colonial army had to serve colonial masters. The autonomous nature of the colonial army chief and military affairs remained unchanged even after the independence of Pakistan.

Conclusion

This essay has provided a historical overview of currents and trends of the British Indian Army. These developments transformed a segment of the British Indian Army into the Pakistan Army. The impact of the 1857 Uprising on regional recruitment to the British military played a large part in the de-Bengalisation and consequent Punjabisation of the Colonial Indian Army; a punishment for Bengal as a region that had rebelled and a reward to the Punjab that aid in the suppression of the Uprising. As a result, it is argued that this shift gave civil and military leadership to the Punjab after the partition, which contributed to Punjabi dominance over other provinces following independence.

Historically, 65 to 75% of the Pakistan army was drawn during the 1950s and 60s from the same areas of the Punjab where the British formerly used to recruit. This was the culmination of the Punjabisation of the Army initiated by the British during and after the Mutiny war of 1857.

The post-partition Indian security threat to the newly carved out Pakistan, as well as the first Kashmir war of 1948, resulted in an increase in the Pakistan Army’s strategic importance within the country. Security against India became the raison d’etre of the Army. The military leadership and political administration considered it necessary to strengthen the army against any potential security threat. The political forces of the country, due to the fear of India, also accommodated the Army in the national and international decisions of the government. This encouraged it to increase its political influence.

Historically, 65 to 75% of the Pakistan army was drawn during the 1950s and 60s from the same areas of the Punjab where the British formerly used to recruit. This was the culmination of the Punjabisation of the Army initiated by the British during and after the Mutiny war of 1857. However, even after independence, the Pakistan Army was still following the trend set in colonial times – recruiting more Punjabis and discouraging Bengalis. That is one of the main reasons why despite constituting 56% of the total population of Pakistan, Bengalis made up less than 7% in the Pakistan Army during the 1960s. The Pakistan Army always demonstrated a lack of trust towards Bengalis, as had the British, and doubted their loyalty to the state. This further alienated them from the ranks of governmental administration.

The Pakistan Army borrowed numerous other autonomous features from the British Army. Intensive training with an emphasis on discipline and efficiency and their separation from the fragmented Pakistani society turned the Pakistani soldiers into a professional, united and autonomous fighting force. However, they formed a force parallel with the government of Pakistan. As the country was a security-oriented entity, any important decision taken by the initial governments of Pakistan needed a nod from the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ). The meeting of the Corps Commanders turned into a kind of a domestic and foreign policy reviewing committee. Sought in the name of Islam and democracy, Pakistan was moving closer towards the form of a military dictatorship.

During colonial rule, the swelling defence budget was a prerequisite for keeping a strong British Army against internal and external threats. However, this practice was continued by the Pakistan Army at the cost of the development of civilian sectors. The defence budget grew in the name of a perceived Indian threat. If the nation could not provide enough for development of the Army, military alliances were signed with the US to muster more resources. Whatever the plight of the nation, the Army remained a well-developed, well-nourished, well-trained, well-equipped, well-organized, united and well-off autonomous institution within Pakistan. The manner in which the British Indian Army was groomed within the province of Punjab ultimately enormously affected Pakistan. At the time of partition, relatively but significantly speaking, Pakistan had neither a bourgeoisie, nor a strong middle class. It lacked a business class. The Punjab was the power center of the country, but it lacked an industrial establishment. Aitzaz Ahsan contends that the British intentionally kept the Punjab industrially backwards as it might have affected recruitment if other means of livelihood, except agriculture, were available to the Punjabis.

The tradition of British military recruitment in the North West of the subcontinent (Punjab and NWFP), was a major factor in the emergence of Pakistan as a quasi-militarized country.

The absence of a Bourgeoisie increased the influence of feudal elites. The landowning aristocracy were in favour of the British due to the benefits they received from them in exchange for contributing Jawans and Sawars to the Army. Thus, the tradition of British military recruitment in the North West of the subcontinent (Punjab and NWFP), was a major factor in the emergence of Pakistan as a quasi-militarized country. It was a country with a weak political structure, feeble political parties and politicians, but a strong feudal class and civil and military bureaucracy. This naturally ‘consolidated the linkages between the military service, agricultural land and political power’. Hence the Muslim League, due to its weak control within the newly created country, had to abdicate in favor of a stronger giant, the Pakistan Army. With the firm support of the feudal class, more agricultural land under its domain, and with its organizational and professional culture, the Pakistan Army began to assert its political role in the hub of the country’s politics. The irony of fate is that it lacked political training. Hence, the Army ran the country like a defence establishment by increasing the defence budget, having defence pacts, and appointing defence services people in the policy making bodies of the country, with effects that ultimately were to be deleterious in the future development of the county. (Concludes)

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Courtesy: Centre for South Asian Studies, School of Social & Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK.

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The post ‘Punjabisation’ in the British Indian Army 1857-1947 and the advent of Military Rule in Pakistan –V first appeared on Sindh Courier.

Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi

School of History & Classics, University of Edinburgh

Social and Psychological Influences on Indigenous Soldiers

An army recruited, trained and disciplined in military ethos was a strong support for the British military campaigns – at home as well as abroad. Influenced and impressed by the British traditions, norms and values, the recruits looked up to their foreign military leaders. Their mental caliber and approach to life was also influence by foreign expeditions. Punjabis fought in nearly all arenas of the [first] Great War:

France and Belgium, Gallipoli and Salonika, Aden and the Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia, Egypt, East Africa, North China. They were exposed to a new and different world beyond their cloistered village. They saw lands and technological advances that they had never envisioned. Their perspective was enlarged. This opened them to a new world, one greater than and different from the peasantry class under the Zamindar (landholder) of their villages. They saw Western civilization more closely during their service in Europe. The colonial master also showed himself more splendidly in London. Peasant-soldiers were impressed by the magnificent civic life of London and Paris. Their interaction with the educated class, especially women, led them to reflect on the comparisons between the life of a woman in Europe and in their respective villages in the Punjab. High levels of cleanliness and sanitation; wax statues at Madame Tussaud’s museum and their amazement at the London underground106 train network all left an impression on the Indian soldiers, as collections of their letters reveal. They were immersed in new thoughts and concepts when they returned to their bullock-cart, plough, and indebtedness after the War was over. They had many stories to tell. The soldiers on leave home or after retirement provided useful propaganda for the ‘Gora Sahib’ [Mr. Whiteman], giving a good impression to the civil society for the British. One Punjabi Muslim wrote from Boulogne in his mail: ‘When one considers this country and these people in comparison with our own country and our own people one cannot but be distressed.

Our country is poor and feeble and its lot is very depressed… In fact they [the British] have a real moral superiority’. Their exposure to the outside world also brought with it prosperity and a positive change in soldiers’ lives. In a time-and-land-locked social capsule, this much traveled “cosmopolitan” rose to a new social status and acquired a new influence in society. Folk songs of the time reflected their growing social status and importance: “Vasna fauji de naal, paanway boot sanay lat maaray” (I will live with a soldier even if he kicks me with his boot on). Therefore, given that two-thirds of the Indian Army was recruited from within [Punjab’s] borders the Punjabi soldier was the chief recipient of societal awe. Salary, living conditions, facilities for the soldiers’-families, post-retirement benefits and rewards were offered with distinction (Jagirs-grants of land- were sanctioned annually) so that the military service would remain attractive to forthcoming generations. The British Empire in return, gained the security and control of the ‘Golden Sparrow’ – India. By now the primary focus of the Raj was to keep firm control over India, so that very little attention was given to the social and developmental civilian sector. As stated earlier, colonial control of India was via the Army. Hence, more and more funds and resources were available for the single largest item in India’s annual budget- Defence Expenditure.

The British controlled and defended the entire subcontinent by focusing and working on only one section of the society – the Army. The Army provided a security umbrella against any kind of threat to internal peace or external aggression. Hence, heavy spending on the Army was an investment for long-term goals. The significant sums expended for the defence budget became a tradition that continued even after partition of 1947 by the successor states. India and Pakistan’s defence budgets continued to grow.

‘Indianisation’ of the British Army

No Indian was allowed to become a direct commissioned officer until the end of the First World War. They could become Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs) or junior commissioned officers. The highest rank an Indian could achieve was that of Subedar-Major.

The VCO was a promoted cadre from the lower ranks and served as a middle rank between the ordinary soldiers and the Commissioned officers, called King’s Commissioned Officers (KCOs), at the Company level, but the holder of a ‘Viceroy’s Commission’, whatever his experience and length of service, was lower in rank and command than the most newly joined of British subalterns. Below the KCOs and VCOs, the Indian Army had a series of non-commissioned officer positions like: Rifleman (private), Lance-naik (Corporal), Havildar (Sergeant), Havildar Major and quarter master Havildars of various levels. As the British were keen to keep an Indian aristocratic class on their side, Lord Curzon introduced the ICC (Imperial Cadet Corps) or ISC (Imperial Service Corps) in 1901, in which the sons of Princes and the wealthy classes more generally could assume officer ranks. It was designated ‘His Majesty’s Native Indian Land Forces’. Their training was wholly conducted in India. However, they were not at par with the KCOs, which were still the domain of the British. By 1911, 78 Indians had joined the ICC. The role of the ICC was essentially ceremonial. These officers did not have any power of command over

British personnel: In the Indian Army, they could not rise above the level of squadron or company officer. It was not surprising that the total number was dropped gradually to 11 by 1914. But it was, as Bryon Farewell says, the first small step towards the ‘Indianisation’ of the Indian Army officer corps. There was no concept of an indigenous army in British India until the late nineteenth century. The First World War proved the worth of the Indian soldier. The Indianite ranks in the British Army were also a demand by political parties of India. The blunt demand in this respect was found in the ‘Report of the Committee appointed by the All-Parties Conference, 1928, to determine the principles of the constitution for India,’ which was commonly called the ‘Nehru Report’. Though no passage is found in the Report itself, or in the sketch of recommendations in Chapter 7 of the document, the Army matter was touched upon in the introduction. It states that the authors recommend the transfer of control over the Indian Army to Ministers. The author of the report quoted Professor Keith’s pungent observation, ‘Self-Government without an effective Indian Army is [an] impossibility, and no amount of protests or demonstrations or denunciations of the Imperial Government can avail to alter that fact’. Criticizing the statement, they added: ‘This is true but we do not accept the constitutional position that without an Indian or Dominion army, India cannot obtain Dominion status. In the first place the Indian Army has not to be created; it exists there already. In the next place historically the position taken by our critics is not correct’.

The First World War compelled the British to take drastic steps in regard to the colonies. One such change was in August 1917 when the Secretary of State for India Edwin Montagu, in his famous statement on ‘increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration’, announced admission to the commissioned cadres for Indians. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was written during the Great War. In the three paragraphs (328-330) which it devoted to the subject of the Army, the way in which the services of the Indian Army in various theatres of war had been and would be recognized was discussed. The authors mentioned the announcement of His Majesty’s Government that the bar which had hitherto prevented the admission of Indians into the commissioned ranks of His Majesty’s Army should be removed. It further declared that this decision had established the principle that an Indian soldier could earn the King’s Commission by his military conduct. This apparently referred to promotion from the ranks. The Report went on to say that other methods of appointment had not yet been decided upon, and emphasized ‘the necessity of grappling with the problem’. As discussed in the earlier paragraph about the demand of Indian leadership for the commissioned ranks for Indians, the Report stated “it is impossible to deal with this large question in connection with our present proposals.

The war is yet not over… The requirements of the future will very largely depend upon the form of peace which is attained. We, therefore, leave this question for consideration hereafter, but with the note that it must be faced and settled”. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report admired the services rendered to the common cause by Indian arms. They contented themselves with noting the urgency and importance of the Army question that would emerge after peace had been restored. However, no concrete steps were taken for the general commissioning of Indians. Therefore, the start of the Indianisation of commissioned ranks was rather slow. Under the pressure of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposed reforms, ‘in 1918 a change was made [according to which] the Indians became eligible for the first time to hold the King’s Commission. Ten vacancies were annually reserved for Indian cadets for competition amongst themselves at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst’. Completion of the course here was a must to get the King’s Commission for an Indian. Keeping in view the colonial legacy and loyalty to the Raj, the Indian government selected the candidates preferring favorites of the Raj- sons of loyal and politically influential families. The debut Commissioned Indian batch that passed out from Sandhurst was posted in Infantry and Cavalry in 1920. A cadet college was also opened in Indore in 1918, which granted permanent commission to its 32 graduates in 1919.

Many factors contributed to Indians’ lack of interest in getting their sons admitted to or commissioned from Sandhurst. Very tough modus operandi of selection, huge expenses, travel to England, and a weak academic record as compared to the British students discouraged Indian cadets. It further contributed to their high rate of failure (30%) in the early years as compared to their British counterparts (3%). As there was some criticism in British circles regarding the Indianisation of Commissioned ranks, ‘an Eight Unit Scheme was introduced by the then C-in-C Lord Rawlinson in 1923’. According to the scheme, it was obligatory for every Indian KCO to spend his first year with the British regiment in India before he was posted on a permanent basis in one of eight units selected in 1923 for complete Indianisation. Indian officers holding commissions in the Indian Army were to be transferred and posted to these eight units. In this way they could fill up the appointments for which they were qualified by their rank and by their length of service. The purpose of such a scheme was four fold: to limit Indian KCOs to these Units; in due course such units would be entirely officered by Indians; to keep the British Officers in to command Indian Officers over and above; and to accelerate the pace of Indianisation. As the senior officers retired and junior officers acquired seniority and were promoted, the time could have come when each of these Indian Units would be commanded and completely officered by Indians. However, it was a very lethargic process based on slow progression. The process could not be completed ‘until the year 1946 at the earliest, since in the Indian Army promotion was regulated by a time scale’.

International relations between the two world wars brought about further changes in the British approach towards its colonies. It had to introduce positive measures to keep the empire from disintegration. Hence, during the inter-war period, not only were reforms introduced but various recommendations were put forth for the increase of Indians in the British Army. General Henry Rawlinson the British C-in-C in 1921 recommended an increase in Indian Officers. In March 1922, a pre-cadet college – the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College – was established in Dehra Dun to prepare young men for Sandhurst. A committee was appointed in June 1925 under Major General Sir Andrew Skeen (at that time, it was popularly known as ‘Indian Sandhurst Committee’ but later on called ‘Skeen Committee’) to establish a military college along the lines of Sandhurst in India and to discuss prospects to increase the number of Indian candidates for the King’s Commission. The committee visited different military institutions which included: England, France, Canada and the US and were given briefings from the officers and trainers alike. At the end of the study tour and following long deliberations, the committee submitted a report in 1926. It recommended an increase in the pace of Indianisation; induction of Indians to the commissioned ranks in the technical branches of the Army as well as the Air Force; abandonment of the Eight Units Scheme, and the establishment of a military college in India. The first two recommendations were accepted by the British government. Instead of the last two recommendations, the government increased the Indian quota at Sandhurst to twenty-five. It also created six vacancies per year at the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, to train Indians as pilots, and six places at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, to train Indian officers for the artillery. Regarding the establishment of a military college in India, Indians were not yet filling all the 10 vacancies annually at Sandhurst. The following figure shows the annual number of Indian Cadets admitted to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, since 1918, and their disposal. The result was disappointing. Therefore, the recommendation for the establishment of a military college in India was declined by the British Government. (Continues)

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Courtesy: Centre for South Asian Studies, School of Social & Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK.

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The post ‘Punjabisation’ in the British Indian Army 1857-1947 and the advent of Military Rule in Pakistan –IV first appeared on Sindh Courier.

Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi

School of History & Classics, University of Edinburgh

Post-1857 Regional Recruitment Shifts – The Evolution of Punjabisation

The 1857 Mutiny or the War of Independence was a major upheaval for the colonial masters. From the military’s point of view, the main responsible factor in the outbreak of the mutiny was the Bengali soldier. His ethnic majority in the Indian Army and his defiance resulted in a war between the Indian soldiers on the one hand and the British troops and their loyalists, such as Punjabis, on the other. Therefore, the British military policy needed a structural overhauling, a well-organized, and systematic and planned British Indian Army. But for the British, the recruitment strategy needed a major shift from the defiant Bengalis to the loyalist Punjabis. Hence, recruitment from 1857 onwards shifted to the North and North Western regions of India (Present–day Pakistan) at the expense of other regions, especially Bengal. As a result, during the first half of the twentieth century the army was dominated by the soldiers from the North and North West of India. Gurkhas from Nepal, the Punjabis and the Pathans were preferred. The number of Punjabis increased gradually. The main ‘martial races’ of the west Punjab recruited were the Tiwanas, Noons, Gakkhars, Janguas, Awans, Baluchis, Khattars, Khokhars, and Sials.

The British Army’s senior officers believed that certain classes and communities in India were warrior races – Martial Races. Such classes and communities were believed to prove better and braver soldiers and to be more suitable for army service. The Eden Commission reported in 1879 that the Punjab was the ‘home of the most martial races of India’ and that it was ‘the nursery’ of the best soldiers. Michael O’Dwyer, who was the governor of Punjab at the time of the fateful Jallianwala Bagh massacre, endorsed the praise and appreciation of the Punjabi soldier expressed by such authorities as Lords Roberts and Kitchener. He said that their argument “was … irrefutable … that if India could only afford a small army of seventy-five thousand British (now reduced to under 60,000) and one hundred and sixty thousand Indian troops for the protection of a subcontinent of over 300 millions of people, it would be unwise to take any but the best Indian material and this was to be found mainly in the Punjab”.

The martial race theory helped to bring about an end to the Peel Commission recommendation that ‘the (regional) armies must balance each other’. According to Field Marshal Frederick Sleigh Roberts, the so-called ‘balance’ was discarded in the 1880s.

The Mutiny brought about a search for a martial race which would not turn against the British once again. The crux of the matter of the ‘martial race theory’ was that some races were superior to others. All natives were not equal in soldierly qualities. Roberts boldly asserted that ‘no comparison can be made between the martial values of a regiment recruited amongst the Ghurkhas of Nepal or the warlike races of Northern India (Punjab and NWFP), and those recruited from the effeminate peoples of the South’. The Punjab’s population accounted for less than 10% of British India, but contributed over half the entire Indian army. The British accommodated communities like Punjabis and Pakhtoons in the Army more than others. It was the beginning of establishing the trend whereby the future security and strategy of the subcontinent would be concentrated in the Punjab and not in Delhi, the capital of the subcontinent.

The reasons for the British tilt towards Punjabis were further substantiated by the perceived Russian threat to the British Empire. The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a security and strategic peril from the North West – the Russian threat to North-Western India. The Russian Empire expanded in Central Asia, and, by 1850, it was about a thousand miles from the British Indian Empire.

Rather soon, it had to touch the tribal belt of NWFP, thus making Afghanistan a buffer between the two empires. Keeping Russians out of Afghanistan, or extending British influence over it, became a principle of British foreign policy. The policy became more assertive after Lord Lytton arrived in India as viceroy in April 1876. ‘The British had already fought two wars with Afghanistan and expected a third in which there might also possibly be Russian involvement’. According to Field Marshal Roberts, the presence of a ‘European army near our frontiers’ had ‘completely changed’ the position. Thus more focus was given to filling the deficiencies in the Indian Army by concentrating on recruitment from the areas closer to these borders, namely the Punjab.

If the British needed the Punjabis’ loyalty in the post-Mutiny period, the Punjabis, for the solution of their personal financial problems, also needed the British.

The personal economy of the peasantry contributed greatly to military recruitment from the Punjab. The availability of man-power, but no jobs, was an imbalanced equation in the region’s economy. It was an agrarian land, but due to shortage of water, soil fertility, erratic rainfall, and shortage of personal finances, the common peasant was facing acute poverty. The memories of the famines of 1753, 1759 and 1783 were still haunting the people. In the meantime, the struggle between Sikhs, Afghans and Mahrattas in the Punjab had further aggravated the situation. The desolation which Ahmed Shah’s army carried out on its route was expressed by the saying that was still current throughout Punjab: ‘What one eats and drinks is one’s own; the rest is Ahmed Shah’s’.

During the ‘great famine’ of 1783, the country was depopulated, the peasants abandoned their villages and died of disease and want in thousands; the state of anarchy was almost inconceivable. So many died of starvation that ‘bodies were thrown into wells unburied, mothers cast their children into rivers, and even cannibalism is said to have been restored’. In the circumstances, army service was a blessing in disguise. It provided them with an alternative to agricultural income. These peasants-turned-soldiers who until now were malnourished, under-paid and maltreated by the rich feudal class were more committed, hardworking, disciplined, and willing to take assignments with more rigor and vigour. The army provided everything: salary, uniform and prestige, as they were working directly with the colonial masters. A large number of them came from the salt range and the Potwar (Potohar) regions of Northern Punjab (especially the districts of Jehlum, Rawalpindi, and Attock) and the adjoining region of NWFP where the peasants were also facing serious economic problems. Indeed, military service provided a guaranteed salary while the peasant class working in the fields was faced with poverty and an uncertain source of income. The new recruitment policy aimed at exploiting the socio-economic life of the Punjab. As a result, the Raj concentrated more on the rural population and discouraged the urban and town-city dwellers. Recruitment focus on rural population was another lesson learnt from the 1857 Uprising.

The Punjab was the first province where an Act restricting land transfers was introduced. It was called the ‘Punjab Alienation of Land Act’. Its aim was to prevent the money-lender from exploiting the cultivator. To gain the support of the peasantry, several other legislative measures were also passed.

The cultivator in the Punjab was undergoing great hardships owing to the exploitation of the money-lender. It was true, therefore, that the peasant should get some relief. The Act limited the transfer of landed property only among the agricultural classes. Moreover, now the peasant could not be evicted by a civil court without the intervention of the revenue authorities. The Act had a three-pronged effect: it restored confidence in the British and encouraged peasants to join their ranks; the non-agricultural class was forced to join the armed forces to save their prestige, while even the landowning class sent their sons to join the British Army. If they already enjoyed a high eminence in the society, military service ranted them a more certain way of keeping their social status.

Granting rewards in return for loyalty was a very traditional and old tool of British domestic and international policy. This contrivance was applied in the North.

Those who joined the British Indian Army were previously peasants. For them the best and the biggest reward was the allotment of land. The British used to allocate land to the soldiers in return for loyalty, gallantry, and on their retirement. Such land awards made the army service an attractive profession amongst the peasant-soldiers. It improved their socio-economic status. The policy of granting agrarian land as a reward for military service also encouraged recruitment. The British Indian government began construction of a new work of canals, their branches and distributaries in the plains of the Western Punjab. This process was initiated in 1885 and continued intermittently until the end of the British rule, during which period large tracts inhabited by semi-nomadic peoples were brought under cultivation. There were nine such areas, called the Canal Colonies, where land with sufficient canal water became available. The British Indian government distributed this land mainly on political considerations, that is, to reward people and communities for services to the Raj.

Substantial tracts of the colony lands were allotted to ex-servicemen, both officers and other ranks, which enhanced the attraction of army service for peasants. Land was also granted for keeping breeding horses, camels, and other animals for the supply to the army and taking care of them. Substantial allotments of land were made to the veterans of World War I.54 No other field of work was pledging such a great return in the North than joining the Army. (Continues)

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Courtesy: Centre for South Asian Studies, School of Social & Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK.

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