The Governance Gamble: The Federation’s War with its Constituting Units
Dr. Mehboob Shaikh
Pakistan’s political odyssey since its inception in 1947 has been defined less by steady institutional growth and more by a restless, often destructive, urge to experiment with the machinery of state. While neighboring India moved swiftly to cement a democratic identity by framing a constitution and establishing a culture of electoral legitimacy, Pakistan’s early years were characterized by a tragic hesitation. This delay in democratic consolidation, coupled with the artificial merging of provinces under the “One Unit” scheme, signaled a deep-seated distrust of pluralism, a distrust that eventually paved the way for the first of many martial laws in 1958.
Today, as whispers of “revisiting” the 18th Amendment and the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award grow louder, the country stands at a familiar and dangerous crossroads. History warns us that the path of recentralization is not a shortcut to efficiency, but a detour toward national instability. To understand why recentralization is a peril rather than a panacea, one must examine the historical burden of the center, the sanctity of the federal consensus, and the fallacy that structural redesign can substitute for effective governance.
The Historical Burden of Centralization
The collapse of the highly centralized political model in 1971 should have been the terminal lesson for Pakistan’s ruling elite. The breakup of the country and the independence of Bangladesh was, at its core, a failure of the centre to acknowledge the political, cultural, and economic aspirations of a distant province. It was a violent proof that a federation cannot be held together by administrative fiat or ideological imposition alone; it requires the consent of the governed.
Yet, the decades that followed saw a recurring pattern where military interventions—justified as “corrective measures” or “necessary pauses,” the consistently bypassed provincial authority. These regimes often introduced localized government systems that were designed not to empower the grassroots, but to undermine the mid-level authority of the provinces. By creating a direct link between the center and local bodies, the provinces were effectively hollowed out. Civilian governments that followed these interventions often found themselves trapped in the same inertia, unable or unwilling to dismantle the centralized structures they inherited. This persistent tension between the center and the provinces created a “governance of suspicion,” where provincial autonomy was viewed not as a strength, but as a threat to national unity.
The 18th Amendment: A Peace Treaty for the Federation
The passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010 was a watershed moment. It was not merely a legislative update; it was a peace treaty for the federation. Passed with a rare and unanimous political consensus, it sought to repair the trust deficit that had plagued the country for sixty years. By abolishing the Concurrent List and devolving significant powers—including health, education, and labour.
The amendment also strengthened constitutional mechanisms like the Council of Common Interests (CCI). This was a shift from “rule by the centre” toward “governance by consensus.” To argue for the reversal of these gains today is to ignore the fundamental grievances of the federation. For smaller provinces, the 18th Amendment is the primary safeguard against the “tyranny of the majority” or the overreach of a federal capital that is often perceived as being out of touch with the realities of the periphery.
Furthermore, the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, which determines the distribution of resources between the center and the provinces, has become a lightning rod for controversy. Critics argue that the center is being left “fiscally squeezed” because too much revenue is transferred to the provinces. However, this argument ignores the fact that the provinces are now responsible for the bulk of public service delivery. Shifting financial power back to the center would not inherently improve the economy; it would simply deprive provinces of the means to manage their own development, sparking a new wave of alienation in Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The Karachi Conundrum: Devaluation via Federalization
The resurfacing proposals to place Karachi—Pakistan’s economic juggernaut—under federal control illustrate the flawed logic of recentralization. Proponents of federal intervention argue that the city’s governance challenges, ranging from crumbling infrastructure to erratic water and power supply, require a “special” federal status.
However, this is a diagnostic error. Karachi’s woes stem from a lack of empowered, consistent, and accountable local government, not a lack of federal oversight. Stripping a province of its economic heart and administrative capital would not only violate the spirit of the 1973 Constitution but would exacerbate the “us vs. them” narrative that has historically destabilized Sindh.
History shows that federal control over Karachi in the past did not resolve its structural issues; instead, it created a sense of disenfranchisement among the local populace. True reform lies in: i) Empowering Local Bodies: Ensuring that the third tier of government has the fiscal and administrative autonomy to solve municipal issues, ii) Institutional Coordination: Improving the synergy between provincial departments and city agencies rather than creating a parallel federal administration and iii) Political Ownership: Building a consensus where all stakeholders feel they have a seat at the table, rather than having decisions imposed from Islamabad.
Governance versus Structural Redesign: The Implementation Gap
The central fallacy of the recentralization argument is the belief that structural changes can fix functional failures. Weak service delivery, corruption, and fiscal pressures are indeed real and pressing problems, but they are symptoms of poor implementation, not a faulty constitutional design.
Pakistan does not suffer from a lack of frameworks; it suffers from a lack of discipline. Every time the state embarks on a “governance experiment”—whether it is a new local government ordinance or a move to amend the constitution—it resets the clock on institutional learning. Stability is the child of continuity. When constitutional arrangements are treated as temporary hurdles to be bypassed, the rule of law is the first casualty.
Recentralization, by its very nature, tends to breed bureaucracy and distance. A centralized system is less responsive to local needs and more prone to the “one-size-fits-all” mentality that has failed Pakistan repeatedly. Instead of looking for a “new” system, the focus should be on making the current system work. This requires political will, investment in human capital, and a commitment to transparency—none of which are achieved by simply moving power from a provincial capital to the federal capital.
The Cost of Ignoring History
Pakistan is currently grappling with unprecedented economic strain and political polarization. At such a volatile juncture, reopening settled constitutional matters like the 18th Amendment or the NFC Award is an unnecessary gamble. The cost of such a move is not just political; it is existential.
Recentralization will not create the “efficiency” its proponents promise. Instead, it will create friction. It will deepen mistrust, provide oxygen to ethno-nationalist narratives, and destabilize the delicate balance that holds the four provinces together. The “perils of recentralization” are not theoretical; they are written in the blood and loss of the country’s history.
The Way Forward
The way forward is not to look back at the failed, hyper-centralized models of the 1950s or 1960s, but to lean into the federalist promises of the 21st century. Durable stability lies in the strengthening of institutions within the existing framework. Policymakers must focus on: a) Trust-Building: Ensuring that the center and provinces operate as partners, not rivals, b) Fiscal Responsibility: Improving tax collection at
both levels rather than fighting over a shrinking pie and c) Consistency: Allowing the 18th Amendment to mature and addressing its implementation gaps through the CCI.
The lesson of 1971 and the subsequent decades is clear: a diverse federation like Pakistan can only thrive through inclusion, devolution, and respect for the constitutional contract. To ignore this lesson is to invite a crisis that the country can no longer afford. The strength of the center is ultimately found in the strength and satisfaction of its provinces.
Read: Karachi: Federalization Is No Solution
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Based in Karachi, Dr. Mehboob Shaikh is a freelance writer
