Sustainable democracy cannot coexist with constitutionalized inequality between institutions meant to serve the same state.
Muqaddas Maqsoom | Islamabad
Civil–military relations in Pakistan have always been a delicate and often contentious element of national politics. With every political transition, debate resurfaces over the military’s constitutional role, the limits of civilian authority, and the durability of democratic institutions. Against this backdrop, the 27th Amendment—framed as part of a new wave of “military reforms”—has generated intense public discussion. Supporters claim it will modernize the security framework; critics argue it represents yet another step toward institutionalizing an already entrenched imbalance between elected and unelected power centers. In my view, the amendment does more to formalize the power asymmetry than to correct it, and its long-term implications for democratic governance are far from benign.
To begin with, Pakistan’s constitutional architecture is designed around the supremacy of parliament. Yet, historical realities paint a contrasting picture. Repeated military interventions, hybrid governance structures, and “informal veto power” in national security matters have gradually created a system where civilians often operate within boundaries set by military preferences. The 27th Amendment, instead of restoring constitutional balance, risks transforming unwritten influence into explicit, legalized authority. This is particularly problematic because the strength of a democracy depends not only on electoral legitimacy but also on ensuring that institutions operate within their constitutionally defined spheres.
One of the primary concerns relates to how the amendment seeks to broaden the military’s consultative or supervisory role in national policy. While collaboration between civilian and military leadership is essential in any functional state—especially one facing terrorism, economic instability, and regional tensions—codifying such an expanded role blurs the line between “advice” and “authority.” Once embedded in the constitution, these roles are no longer subject to political negotiation or parliamentary oversight; they become permanent features of governance. This undermines democratic flexibility, which is vital for responding to changing political and social realities.
Another dimension of the imbalance lies in its symbolic impact. Constitutional amendments reflect societal priorities and values. By embedding military prerogatives into the nation’s highest legal document, the state implicitly communicates that civilian institutions are either incapable or untrustworthy in handling core state functions. This narrative weakens public confidence in democratic processes and reinforces a culture of dependency on non-elected institutions. Instead of strengthening parliament, political parties, and civilian bureaucracy, such reforms may inadvertently validate their perceived weakness.
However, dismissing the need for military reforms altogether would be intellectually dishonest. Pakistan faces real security challenges that require efficient coordination between institutions and clear frameworks to prevent friction. If reforms are genuinely needed, they should aim at increasing transparency, accountability, and inter-institutional checks, not solidifying a single institution’s dominance. A balanced approach could include modernizing oversight committees, enhancing civilian expertise in security policy, and ensuring the military operates under clearly defined legal parameters without expanding beyond them.
A deeper issue is that the amendment does not address Pakistan’s systemic weaknesses: inconsistent governance, partisan polarization, weak rule of law, and the absence of long-term policy planning. Strengthening democracy requires reforms that empower civilians, not sideline them. A state’s stability grows when elected representatives are trained, institutions function independently, and political processes mature enough to handle crises without resorting to extra-constitutional interventions. When constitutional space is disproportionately allocated to one institution, it becomes harder for others to grow.
Defenders of the amendment argue that Pakistan’s unique geopolitical environment justifies such changes. Yet countries with far greater security threats—South Korea, Turkey, or Indonesia—have successfully transitioned toward stronger civilian control after periods of military dominance. They demonstrate that professional militaries thrive not by exerting political control but by focusing on defense capabilities, strategic planning, and national security under civilian-led policy frameworks. Pakistan can aspire to the same trajectory, but only if reforms strengthen democratic legitimacy rather than institutional hierarchies.
In conclusion, the 27th Amendment, while packaged as a necessary modernization effort, risks formalizing the civil–military power imbalance that has long haunted Pakistan’s political development. Sustainable democracy cannot coexist with constitutionalized inequality between institutions meant to serve the same state. Reforms should reinforce equilibrium, not disrupt it. If Pakistan is to progress, its political leadership must build institutional competence, strengthen constitutional norms, and resist the temptation to outsource statecraft to unelected centers of power. Only then can the nation move toward a future where democracy is not merely procedural, but genuinely empowered—capable of governing without constitutional shadows cast by institutional imbalance.
Read: Pakistan: Politics of Amendments
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Writer is a student at International Islamic university Islamabad studying Bs Political science.
