“We live in a world… that is governed by strength. That is governed by force. That is governed by power.”
By Tom Arms | London
The rules-based world order has been the cornerstone of international diplomacy since the end of World War Two. It is surviving by the friction of inertia alone, and many argue that we have already slipped into the abyss of the unknown.
The ancient régime depended heavily on American support and direction. Donald Trump has indicated that providing that support is no longer in America’s interests. According to Stephen Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff in the White House and a Key Trump adviser, what counts now is not law, but raw power.
As he told CNN: “We live in a world… that is governed by strength. That is governed by force. That is governed by power.”
In early January, Trump demonstrated this approach when he effectively kidnapped Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and announced the takeover of the country’s oil reserves for the “foreseeable future.” In a separate move, he appears to be moving quickly to gain control of Greenland.
This coming week Secretary of State Marco Rubio is expected to fly to Copenhagen with a firm offer to buy Greenland. Trump has made it clear that if the Danes refuse to cooperate, he might consider “military intervention,” raising the prospect of conflict with a fellow member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Greenland is a self-governing territory of Denmark, which retains responsibility for Greenland’s defense and foreign affairs. The Danish government has emphasized that any decision regarding U.S. ownership would ultimately rest with Greenland’s 57,000 residents. The mainly Inuit population has said that it wants nothing to do with America and, in fact, seeks independence from Denmark. However, a country with such a small population would face significant challenges in defending itself.
A U.S. invasion of Greenland would be a serious blow to the international order. One of NATO’s fundamental principles is that allies respect each other’s territorial integrity. They certainly do not attack one another. An attack on, or annexation of, Greenland—a territory of NATO ally Denmark—would seriously undermine the credibility of the alliance. Since the end of World War Two, American leadership of NATO has helped sustain one of the longest periods of relative peace and prosperity in modern history. Peace in Europe has spread ripple-like throughout the rest of the world.
Read: The countries Trump is threatening — and why
Oddly enough, there is no need for a clash over Greenland. Under the 1951 U.S.-Danish Defense Agreement, the United States can base as many troops as needed in Greenland, and Denmark has indicated it may also allow American access to Greenland’s mineral resources, although this could face resistance from environmentally-conscious Greenlanders.
So what can Europe do to protect itself—militarily, politically, and economically? For a start, it must not panic, but it must quickly and decisively while (if this does not sound contradictory) keeping its options open. The old continent has grown too dependent on American security guarantees, and replacing them will take years, require costly rearmament programs, and necessitate major policy changes. This, in turn, will mean less funding available for the welfare programs that have been a hallmark of post-war Europe.
There are roughly 100,000 American troops committed to the defense of Europe. Europeans would not need to replace every U.S. soldier individually, as logistical challenges would differ, but the costs would still be significant. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that European NATO members would need to spend approximately $344 billion on procurement alone.
A greater concern is the possible weakening or end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, estimated at 5,459 warheads. The United States has 5,177, Britain 225, and France 290. Nuclear strategy is based on the deterrent threat of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Europe which means the 515 European-based warheads are relatively minor in comparison.
To counter the Russian threat, Europeans would need to either Retain the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Build a larger nuclear arsenal or develop an independent nuclear strategy with command and control procedures that shift from MAD to a Minimum Nuclear Deterrence (MIND) —or pursue some combination of these options.
The challenge is compounded by the fact that the British Trident delivery system is supplied by the U.S. and integrated into NATO defense. The French nuclear deterrent remains independent, but replacing Trident with European-made missiles and bringing both British and French deterrents under European command would be extremely difficult politically and militarily.
Intelligence-sharing adds another layer of complexity. U.S. and British intelligence operations are deeply intertwined, particularly under the Five Eyes Agreement, which includes Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. As the Internet and social media have grown, electronic intelligence has become increasingly important. Severing these ties would be costly for both the United States and its allies.
Economic ties between Europe and the U.S. are equally significant. Europe and America maintain a $1.7 trillion annual trading relationship. The U.S. is Britain’s single largest trading partner. Legal and financial services are deeply interconnected, and disentangling these links would take decades, be expensive, disruptive and expose all the western systems to attack during any transitional period.
Any European response must be accompanied by enhanced political cooperation within the continent. This faces opposition from Britain’s Brexiteers and right-wing Euro-sceptics in EU countries. Moves such as the potential re-entry of Britain into the customs union represent only small steps toward stronger European cohesion as a counterbalance to American influence.
Europeans should approach any renegotiation with America slowly and carefully. Fortunately, they have US public opinion on their side: according to a 2024 Gallup Poll, only 12 percent of Americans favour withdrawal from NATO. Congress has also reinforced this position: the National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the president from suspending, terminating, or withdrawing from NATO without a two-thirds majority in the Senate and bars the use of federal funds to withdraw U.S. troops without congressional approval.
For now, Congress is unlikely to support a breakup of the transatlantic alliance. Nevertheless, an increasingly vocal anti-NATO and anti-European lobby is growing in the U.S. European policymakers must start planning for scenarios once considered “unthinkable,” but which are now being seriously thought about in Washington.
Read: Observations of an Expat: The Long View
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Tom Arms has returned from his Christmas holidays. He is the foreign editor of Liberal Democrat Voice and author of The Encyclopedia of the Cold War and America Made in Britain. He is also available for lectures on world affairs.
