If democracy is to mean anything beyond slogans, then the irrigation sector in Sindh must be examined not through rhetoric but through records, audits, inquiries, and institutional outcomes.
By Noor Muhammad Marri, Advocate | Islamabad
Democracy is not merely the ritual of elections; it is the continuous discipline of institutional accountability. A political party that claims democratic credentials must subject its own governance to scrutiny, particularly in sectors that directly affect life, livelihood, and survival. In Sindh, since 2008, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has governed uninterruptedly, presenting itself as the custodian of democratic continuity after long periods of authoritarian rule. This longevity in power carries not only political legitimacy but also full moral and constitutional responsibility for the performance of provincial institutions. Among these, the Sindh Irrigation Department stands as one of the most powerful, resource-intensive, and least transparent departments, directly impacting agriculture, ecology, flood management, and rural survival.
If democracy is to mean anything beyond slogans, then the irrigation sector in Sindh must be examined not through rhetoric but through records, audits, inquiries, and institutional outcomes.
The Sindh Irrigation Department controls canals, barrages, embankments, drainage systems, and flood protection infrastructure. Its functioning is embedded in annual provincial budgets, supplementary grants, and special flood allocations approved by the Sindh Assembly. In addition to domestic budgetary allocations, the department has been a major recipient and executing agency for foreign-funded projects, particularly those financed or supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and other international donors, especially in the aftermath of repeated floods.
Despite this centrality, the department’s record reflects a persistent gap between appropriation and performance, allocation and outcome, and democratic authority and administrative accountability.
Nowhere is this failure more visible than in the history of Sindh’s drainage megaprojects — particularly the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) and the Right Bank Outfall Drain (RBOD).
The LBOD project, conceived to drain saline and flood waters from lower Sindh, has for decades been associated with environmental degradation, coastal intrusion, destruction of agricultural land, and recurring flooding in districts such as Badin and Thatta. Instead of resolving waterlogging and salinity, LBOD has repeatedly been cited in audit observations, media investigations, and civil society reports as a project where design flaws were compounded by poor execution, lack of maintenance, and unaccounted expenditures. Successive rehabilitation and “improvement” works were sanctioned under different heads, yet the suffering of affected communities continued, raising serious questions about institutional learning and financial oversight.
The RBOD project, particularly RBOD-II, represents an even clearer case of institutional failure. Approved, re-approved, re-designed, and re-cost over the years, RBOD became a symbol of endless expenditure without completion. Parliamentary forums, including Public Accounts Committee (PAC) proceedings, repeatedly questioned the Sindh Irrigation Department regarding stalled works, revised scopes, and non-achievement of objectives despite repeated releases of funds. The matter did not remain confined to administrative criticism; it entered the domain of criminal accountability.
The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) formally initiated inquiries and filed references concerning alleged corruption and misuse of funds in RBOD-related works. These proceedings named serving and retired officials of the Sindh Irrigation Department, contractors, and consultants, highlighting issues such as non-execution of works, fake measurements, and payments without physical progress. The existence of such references is itself a matter of record and speaks to the gravity of concerns surrounding the project.
Parallel to these projects, the creation of the Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (SIDA) was presented as a reform initiative — decentralizing control, introducing participatory management through area water boards, and improving transparency. In practice, SIDA became another layer of authority without meaningful accountability. Complaints from growers’ associations, particularly in lower Sindh, consistently alleged mismanagement, neglect of maintenance, and irregularities in expenditure. These concerns surfaced in audit paras, PAC discussions, and public protests, yet structural reform remained elusive.
Floods provided repeated moments of truth. Each major flood was followed by special allocations, emergency releases, and international assistance, often routed through the irrigation department for embankment repairs, drainage clearance, and rehabilitation works. Yet, recurring breaches, repeated damage at the same locations, and the absence of durable solutions suggested that flood allocations were treated as episodic spending exercises rather than long-term institutional responsibility.
What deepens the democratic concern is not merely that corruption allegations exist — such allegations arise in many systems — but that political ownership of the department has remained largely symbolic. Since 2008, PPP governments in Sindh have exercised full control over policy, appointments, and priorities. The irrigation department did not function in a political vacuum. If democratic continuity is claimed as an achievement, then democratic accountability for institutional decay must also be accepted.
Democracy demands more than defending the right to rule; it requires answering how power was used. For Sindh, the irrigation department is not a marginal institution — it is the backbone of agriculture, rural economy, and flood survival. The unresolved questions surrounding LBOD, RBOD, and SIDA are therefore not technical matters; they are democratic questions. They ask whether institutions answer to assemblies, whether audits lead to correction, and whether accountability bodies are allowed to conclude their work without political obstruction.
Only when records are opened, responsibilities fixed, and institutions corrected can democracy move from slogan to substance in Sindh. The irrigation department, given its centrality to agriculture, flood survival, and ecological balance, must therefore be subjected to sustained public, parliamentary, and professional scrutiny. At this stage, Sindh’s water experts, hydrologists, and policy professionals are respectfully urged to place their considered uptake on these issues in the public domain, rather than confining debate to abstract climate narratives. Silence on institutional performance, especially in matters involving irrigation, drainage projects, and public funds, weakens not only democratic accountability but also professional credibility itself.
Read: Sindh under an ‘Engineered Sleep’
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Noor Muhammad Marri is an Advocate and Mediator, based Islamabad
