The CPEC will continue to be in limbo, threatening massive economic and infrastructural development unless Pakistani leadership devises an effective strategy that will satisfy Chinese leaders.
By Ambassador M. Alam Brohi
The development projects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have apparently been grounded to a halt or slowed down due mainly to China’s concerns about the security of its personnel working in Pakistan. With a string of terrorist attacks on Chinese workers within the past few years, the Chinese leaders have come to the end of their tether of endurance, showing no more confidence in the ability of the Pakistani government for any foolproof security of their workers. There are unconfirmed reports that they have linked the resumption of work on China-funded projects with forming a joint security force to protect their workers.
No doubt, Pakistan has been going through a bad law and order situation with an uptick in terrorist attacks. An Islamabad-based think tank reports Pakistan experienced 60 nationwide terrorist attacks in November last year, in which 169 lives were lost and over 200 citizens injured. Recently, there was a deadly attack on Chinese citizens near Karachi Airport. All these attacks have heightened concerns in Beijing over the safety of the Chinese personnel working on the CPEC projects, notwithstanding the significance of the CPEC to China, which is the flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The CPEC is one of the most ambitious Chinese initiatives in Pakistan. Its launch raised high hopes and was viewed as a game changer, an ambitious economic and trade project and a blazing message of prosperity in the three contiguous regions of South Asia, South West Asia and Central Asia. It promised to bring massive investments of some $60 billion to Pakistan to build communication and economic infrastructure, including power-generating stations, airports, roads, dams, and economic zones.
However, it was simultaneously viewed as a fissiparous project stirring local rivalries for a bigger piece of the cake in terms of economic projects and heightening regional and international hostilities over the roads and routes of the corridor passing through territories disputed by certain countries. It was also increasingly considered an extension of the new economic Great Game being played out in the resource-rich Central Asian region by the world powers, particularly over the oil and gas pipeline routes.
The ambitious plan of the Belt and Road Initiative launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 at the heel of President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” policy with an estimated cost of over $1 trillion aimed to interconnect over 60% of the global population of Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa for economic, trade and commercial transactions to sustain growth and development. The initiative comprises passenger and freight land routes linking China from its East Coast and the South China Sea with Mongolia, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East, and European countries through the Eurasian Bridge planned beyond Central Asia. Similarly, China plans to lay a network of railways from its East coast connecting with the Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.
The BRI also has a Seaport component. China has already undertaken to develop its ‘Pearl Maritime Silk Way’ from its East coast and the South Sea Islands to Djibouti, aiming at intercontinental connectivity linking South East Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. These seaports included Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Mayday Island in Myanmar, Colombo in Sri Lanka, Victoria in Seychelles and Djibouti in East Africa. The Pearl Maritime project would enable China to bypass the congested Strait of Malacca and circumvent potential choking points in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea through which about 80% of its annual outbound trade of over $5000 billion (first ten months of 2024) has been transiting.
The Pakistani leadership, engaged in Punjab-centric policies and political disputes, never elaborated on the CPEC’s economic and employment benefits for the estranged Baloch population.
This latticework of roads, railways and seaports connecting China with the vast continents, spurring its ongoing economic development, was bound to ring alarm bells within the rival capitals. This helps us understand the current USA-backed political and strategic convergences in the Pacific and Asian regions to counter the rise of China. Similarly, the CPEC stoked India’s deep-seated hostility towards Pakistan, impelling New Delhi to dispute the roads and routes passing through the Northern regions of Gilgit and Baltistan. It is heartening that China understood the sinister Indian game of sabotaging the CPEC. China gave two ships to Pakistan’s navy to protect cargo ships calling on or leaving the Gwadar Seaport. This raised many eyebrows at the regional and international level about the Seaport of Gwadar ultimately being a naval base for China.
These were the hopes, apprehensions and concerns that the BRI and CPEC unleashed at the regional and global level. The local apprehensions of the estranged Baloch population surrounding Gwadar, fueled by the regional countries to fail Gwadar Seaport as a hub of economic and commercial connectivity, were beside the international efforts to countervail the BRI. Thus, the CPEC signified enormous security challenges for Pakistani authorities. This was well understood. Pakistan raised a brigade exclusively for the security of the Chinese personnel no sooner than the CPEC was launched. The estranged Baloch leaders claimed the local people were carefully kept out of this enormous employment opportunity. The Balochistan Federal Constabulary was also strengthened to deal with the security threats.
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Notwithstanding these security measures, the Chinese personnel unfortunately remained unsafe. The recent years witnessed an uptick in the terrorist attacks on the Chinese workers in Karachi and elsewhere. The BLA and the TTP have taken responsibility for these terrorist attacks. We know the districts surrounding Gwadar are infested with separatists who have been waging a war of attrition against Pakistani security forces since 2006. Karachi witnessed three deadly attacks on the Chinese Consulate, the Confucius Centre of the Karachi University and the Karachi Airport. A few years ago, Gwadar Intercontinental also came under terrorist attacks where some Chinese Engineers were reportedly staying. After every attack, the Chinese leaders recorded their protests quietly through diplomatic channels.
The bad law and order situation in the country owing to the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan, the religious militancy and bloody sectarian clashes in KPK has compelled China, this time around, to take an exceptionally strong position over the security of their workers stalling or slowing down work on the CPEC projects. It has suggested to Pakistan for a joint force to deal with the security menace to its workers. This was reportedly made clear to Pakistan at the highest level during Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Beijing and the Chinese Premier’s tour to Pakistan just before the SCO Summit. This is unfortunate, reflects poorly on the government’s incompetence, and disrepute the country’s security forces.
China has been a friend of all seasons. It has emerged as the biggest creditor in Pakistan, with $29.5 billion in long- and short-term credits. The second phase of the CPEC, which includes economic zones, motorways, railway tracks, research agriculture communes and relocation of Chinese industry, would have boosted the country’s overall economic development. Moreover, the significance of CPEC for Pakistan lies in expanding the economic and commercial operations at the Gwadar Seaport and connectivity with the Central Asian States and the European continent through Xinjiang and the Eurasian Bridge. This would unleash Pakistan’s potential for trade, spurring social and economic development and employment opportunities.
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The Pakistani leadership, engaged in Punjab-centric policies and political disputes, never elaborated on the economic and employment benefits of the CPEC to the estranged Baloch population to counter the forceful narrative of the separatists. Instead, it underlined the capture of the precious resources of Baloch land by the powerful federal authorities in collaboration with foreign powers, quoting the example of Saindak, Reko Diq and Gwadar.
Notwithstanding the unsubstantiated status of the Chinese proposal, the joint security operations with China would revive regional and international concerns and give impetus to the earlier concerns that Gwadar Seaport would ultimately become a strategic naval facility for China in the Arabian Sea. This would put Pakistan under enormous pressure from the US-led Western world, signaling it as a vassal state of China. This would add a new weapon to the armory of the Baloch insurgents against the Federation. The neighboring Iran would also look askance at the joint security operations.
The CPEC will continue to be in limbo to the peril of massive economic and infrastructural development unless Pakistani leadership devises an effective strategy to the satisfaction of Chinese leaders to deal with the security menace to their workers. This is possible provided our political and military leadership disengages from the political controversies centered in Punjab and Balochistan, boldly resolving the root cause of the debilitating political polarization and creating an enabling atmosphere for a whole-of-nation approach to the security menace. We should reckon the Chinese leaders are also concerned about Pakistan’s decade-long political polarization and economic decline.
Disillusioned with Pakistan’s unstable security and political conditions, China could develop another corridor from Afghanistan. The suggested holistic approach will also need a thorough review of our Afghan policy to neutralize the Afghan support to Baloch separatists and TTP. We need political, diplomatic and strategic acumen and accommodation to overcome this challenge.
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The author is a former member of the Foreign Service of Pakistan and has served as Ambassador for seven years. This article has been shared by the author.
First published in South Asia Magazine (January 2025 issue)
